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I. INTRODUCTION

The notion of exclusivity is alive and well as one of the pillars of the
traditional nuclear family. This ideology has served the nuclear familyt effectively by painting and reinforcing a clear picture of the idealized family as a self-contained unit comprised of a married heterosexual couple with children.2 It is exclusive in a number of senses.
First, a child cannot have more than two parents! For example,
when a stepparent adopts a spouse's child, the child's other natural
parent is no longer legally recognized as a parent
Single parent
families are possible, but cast in the shadow of the ideology of the
nuclear family, they are seen as inferior and deficient; as the pejorative term "broken home" illustrates.
Second, the rights and duties which flow from legal parentage are
either present or they are not; there is little room for "quasiparenting." For the most part, parenting is an all-or-nothing proposition.5 The ideology of the nuclear family does not script a significant
role for the extended family, or for other members of the community
who may play key roles in the lives of children.6
1. Throughout this article, the term "nuclear family" is used to invoke the norm of the
family that consists of two married heterosexual people with children.
2. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-32 (1989) (holding that a biological father has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in a relationship with a child if the child's
mother is married to another man).
3. CompareJohnsonv. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that only a gestational or
genetic mother is legally recognized as a child's parent), with Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110 (illustrating that the natural or genetic father loses parental rights to the mother's husband).
4. SeeLehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-63 (1983) (stressing that the biological father's
rights are only protected if he grasps the opportunity and "accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (recognizing the adoption of a child by a stepfather). In both cases, the stepfather was ultimately permitted to adopt
the child with the effect of excluding the natural father from playing any role at all. See Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 86-09-038808 [1990] REPORTS OF FAMILY L.3d (R.F.L.] 203
(B.C.S.C.) (Canadian case denying a natural father access to his children).
5. See Nicole L. Sault, Many Mothers, Many Fathers: The Meaning of ParentingAround the
World; 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 395, 398-401 (1996). Sault identifies three core concepts of

American kinship: biology, autonomy, and control. These concepts also underlie the norm of
exclusivity. She argues that people do not willingly share control over a child whom they see as
their "own." This can be observed in custody disputes following a divorce: "[E]ach parent wants
full custody of the child, or complete ownership and control. Visitation rights are not usually
awarded to the grandparents, aunts, uncles, or other members of either parent's kin group.
Sharing would be interpreted as losing control." Id. at 400. See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspectiveon Parents'Rights,14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747,

1754-55, 1767, 1810-12, 1861 (1993) (noting that law "overvalue[s] ownership through procreation" and that "[r]ather than seeking to provide adults for children who need them, [the law]
seems intent on securing children for adults who claim them").
6. See Sault, supra note 5, at 395, 398, 405 (giving numerous examples of various societies
throughout the world where children are raised in a larger community context). In some of
these cultures, even words such as father and mother are extended to a range of people other
than those to whom those terms commonly apply in North America and children are part of a
"larger kin group." Id. According to Sault, this is very much at odds with what generally hap-
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Third, although the law does provide for ending and re-creating
family units through divorce, remarriage, and adoption, each new
unit legally annihilates the pre-existing unit. The law does not contemplate the reality of overlapping families who reunite for weddings
and funerals and share memories, children, and friends. There is no
vision of overlapping families, of relationships that develop between
present wives and ex-wives, cooperating over blended families or of
the reformulated, but continued parental relationships as former
spouses.7 In this sense, the notion of family constructs boundaries
that exclude all but a limited number of relationships as legally relevant.
This Article argues that the norms of exclusivity serve neither the
interests of children nor the interests of society as a whole. It severs
children and their parents from the broader community, and particularly from certain members of that community who might contribute
to the lives of children. These individuals supplement and complement the parents. A list might include stepparents, birth mothers,
and gestational mothers." Social practices challenge the norms of exclusivity, but the law has been slow in responding. For example,
pens in the United States, where "[t]he predominant view of kinship ... equates family with
biological connections, while the associated phenomena of attachment, care-giving, and coresidence are ignored." Id. at 398.
7. See Anne Martin, Life With(out) Brian: The Ex-Wives Club, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 8,
1996, at A22 (describing a graphic and humorous relationship that developed between Brian's
three ex-wives who got to know each other through the children (all half-siblings) of the various
marriages). These networks can be supportive and constructive, especially for the children involved, and yet our legal constructs fail to acknowledge their existence.
8. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie that Binds: The ConstitutionalRight of Children to Maintain
Relationships with Parent-LikeIndividuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 393 (1994); see also Woodhouse,
supranote 5, at 1753 (rightly pointing out that "children know their parents by what they do
and not necessarily for what they are"). Woodhouse's argument can be transposed to other
relationships, notjust parental ones. It is in itself a basis for recognizing the contributions of
various actors playing a role in a child's life. The connections worth maintaining should not be
limited to vertical relationships, such as those between a child and a stepparent. Horizontal
connections should also be recognized in a more inclusive vision of the family. See, e.g., P.
(MAR.) (Litigation Guardian of) v. Catholic Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto
[1995] R.F.L.4th 95, 105 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) (discussing a woman who brought two orphaned
children to Canada from Mexico). For two years, these children lived with and were cared for
by her. At the end of that time, however, she decided to adopt only one of the children and to
make the other a Crown ward. The latter sought access to his sister. Judge Jarvis directed a
hearing on the merits based on the unusual circumstances of this case. While conscious of the
effect the proceedings started by the child must have on the adoptive mother and her family, he
said that the relationship of brother and sister is a basic human relationship which existed between the two children long before the adoptive mother became involved in their lives. Id. at
105. However, the maintenance of horizontal connections is not systematically seen as being
worthy of protection. Indeed, courts have concluded that the French word "parent" in article
583 of the CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC [C.C.Q.] only refers to the father or the mother of an
adopted person and does not include brothers or sisters. Droit de la famille - 2046 [1994]
RECUEULS DEJURISPRUDENCE DU QUtBEC [R.J.Q.] 2413 (C.Q.); Droit de Ia famille - 321 [1987]
RECUEILS DE DROrr DE LA FAMILLE [R.D.F.] 1 (Trib. jeun.). See discussion of article 583, infra
Part III.B.2.

JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW

(Vol. 6:505

while adoption traditionally severed all links with the biological family in favor of the new family, "open adoption," which allows the birth
mother a continuing role, is becoming increasingly common. 9 Similarly, reconstituted families typically allocate parenting roles among
custodial, non-custodial, and stepparents, although the law has delayed acknowledging the contributions of stepparents. ° Recently,
grandparents are demanding greater legal recognition for the roles
that they frequently play in a child's upbringing." In addition, the
reality of gay and lesbian family units challenge the notion that a
child can have only one mother or one father. These families have
done so, largely by creating units that understand themselves to be a
family, and live as such with two mothers or two fathers.
In this Article, I argue for a reconceptualization of the family which
would:
(i) recognize the limitations of the ideology of the exlcusive family
and articulare a model that includes non-traditional family
units as well as the range of roles potentially played by various actors in the life of a child;
(ii) allocate the ultimate decision-making authority to a particular
sphere, such as the primary caretaker or caretakers; this will
be referred to throughout the Article as the "core family
unit;"
(iii) having done so, encourage the involvement of those who,
9. See, eg., Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107 HARV. L. REV. 913, 929-32
(1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING (1993) (discussing adoption reform)).
10. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 363 (analyzing the development of children's constitutional rights).
11. See Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents,Parents and Grandchildren:ActualizingInterdependency
in Law, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1315, 1319 (1994) (calling for the need of legal recognition for
grandparents through "co-parenthood rights") [hereinafter Czapanskiy, Grandparents,Parents
and Grandchildren];Karen Czapanskiy, Babies, Parents and Grandparents:A Story of Two Cases, 1
AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 85 (1993) (identifying factors that influenced court decisions to grant
adoption by grandparents).
12. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow, RedefiningFamilies: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 269 (1991) (worrying whether courts or the public will accept a "functional" family unit
consisting of two mothers); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fa.
thers:Is It an Optionfor Lesbian and HeterosexualMothers, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375 (1996) (arguing that it is misdirected to blame social ills on the father's absence from raising children and
to fail to focus on the needs of the child instead of whether there is a nuclear family); Nancy D.
Polikoff, The Social Construction ofParenthood in One Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 203 (1996) (challenging a New York Supreme Court decision and arguing that
children from gay and lesbian families should be accorded the full range of protection available
to children in heterosexual families); Nancy D. Polikoff, This ChildDoes Have Two Mothers: RedefiningParenthoodto Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Motherand Other NontraditionalFamilies,78
GEO. LJ. 459 (1990) (advocating for an expanded definition of parenthood to include lesbianmothers in order to serve the best interest of the child) (hereinafter Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers].
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while not "legal parents" in the usual sense, have nevertheless established a special relationship with the child. For
example, access and visitation might be facilitated and encouraged.
Part II of this Article explores the implications and criticisms of exclusivity in family law in areas that provide some useful insights into
issues arising in the context of New Reproductive Technologies
("NRTs"). Although the potential list of topics one could examine
for this purpose is long, this Article considers only post-divorce families and the joint custody trend, stepparent adoptions and briefly,
open adoptions. These topics have been selected because, while the
issues overlap, each topic highlights particular inadequacies or injustices inherent in the concept of the exclusive family. Part III explores
the implications of this critique for filiation and related issues arising
in the context of NRTs's
A. The NuclearFamily: The Monty Python Parrot
At the outset, it should be emphasized that the ideology of the nuclear family and the ideology of the exclusive family, while overlapping, are distinct. The ideology of the nuclear family has been under
siege in recent years..14 The basis for the criticism overlaps with, but is
not identical to, the basis for criticizing the exclusivity of the family.
The literature reflects both normative and descriptive reasons for attacking the dominance of the nuclear family. To some extent, the
arguments are normative, asserting that the values promoted by the
traditional ideology are, in various ways, wrong.
The most familiar critique focuses on the patriarchal nature of the
nuclear family, 5 even in this egalitarian age.16 In addition, there is
the more descriptive argument that the traditional nuclear family has
failed to live up to its promise, and that it is, like the proverbial parrot
in the Monty Python skit, deadY. This failure is evidenced by the
13. In writing this article, the law is drawn as it exists in a number of jurisdictions from
both Canada, including the civil jurisdiction of Quebec, and the United States to illustrate the
various issues and problems that arise.
14. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 15 (1995) (describing how state policies are implemented to halt any trends that diverge from the traditional nuclear family) [hereinafter
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER].
15. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 27 (arguing that these arguments fail to consider the family as an institution but, rather, focus on gender).
16. For example, the traditional family does not encompass the lesbian family. See Polikoff,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers, supranote 12, at 464.
17. See FiNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 155-56 (noting that the performance of the traditional nuclear family is a tarnished one).
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prevalence of domestic violence and child abuse within traditional
family units.18 A third basis for attacking the nuclear family is linked
to the ideology of the family as exclusive. The concern is that by excluding non-traditional units, the nuclear family does not reflect the
reality of many, if not most, people's lives. 9 Furthermore, it masks
and devalues other forms of family which are in fact quite functional
and socially valuable. 0
In short, there is a large gap between the rhetoric and the reality of
the exclusive family. If one accepts the importance of the channeling
function in family law, the law is "channeling" in favor of a simplistic,
impoverished vision of family. That vision fails to contemplate the
needs and realities of many children by excluding many people who
could or do contribute in various ways to their upbringing. In a society in which fewer children have two married heterosexual parents
who can attend to their needs, and in which the state is contributing
less supplementary support and resources, the rationale underlying
the paradigm of the exclusive family appears to be especially weak. A
premise of this Article is that in such a society, children will benefit if
we encourage and facilitate the maintenance of connections with
those in the community who may have special links with them.
B. The Exclusive Family as Handmaiden of the NuclearFamily
The arguments for and against the paradigm of the exclusive family, like those pertaining to the nuclear family, are both normative
and descriptive. The normative argument in support of the exclusive
family is that families work best, for both parents and children, when
they are exclusive units because authority and responsibility are localized, readily identified, and efficient. 22 One criticism of the exclusive
family is that exclusivity is just a means for promoting and protecting

18. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 14, at 156 (describing how the family
can be cast as potentially violent).
19. See FiNEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 14, at 226-36 (arguing persuasively
that principles ofjustice call for reconceptualization of the family).
20. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 226-36; see also STEPHANIE
CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992)
(contending that the nuclear family is based largely on myth and has not borne much relationship to real life).
21. See Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495,
502 (1992) (citing Martha Fineman who emphasizes that families may include adult dependent
children or elderly people who need care from other family members); see also FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 14, at 235 (noting how the child stands for all forms of dependency).
22. See Schneider, supra note 21, at 502 (explaining how these normative approaches describe ideals that gained substantial allegiance in Americans' lives).
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the idealized nuclear family from outside disruption or interference.2
As Carl Schneider effectively shows, family law demonstrates a preference for "channeling" people
into nuclear families through a web of
24
incentives and disincentives.
One incentive is the exclusivity of the unit.H Exclusivity is one of
the "perks" of the nuclear family that "channels" people into that particular unit.26 This criticism is not of exclusivity, rather it is about
what sorts of groupings may benefit from the protection entailed by
exclusivity. Other sorts of groupings do not generally receive the
benefits of autonomy and control that are essential, to some extent,
One of the reasons that lesbian
to the project of child rearing.
mothers have been so concerned to exclude known donors from
playing any parental role at all has been the fear that they are particularly vulnerable to donor interference as a non-traditional family.2 It
is worth noting that critics of the traditional nuclear family attack it as
a norm that sets other sorts of families apart as inferior.2 These critiques do not suggest that there is anything wrong with a two-parent
heterosexual family."
This brings us to an important crossroad. If we disentangle the
narrow idea of the exclusive nuclear family from the concept that
there must be some autonomy and control within the family, we can
23. See Schneider, supra note 21, at 502 (explaining how such incentives as social currency
and government support channel people into nuclear families).
24. Schneider, supra note 21, at 498.
25. Schneider, supranote 21, at 498.
26. Of course, the appeal of the nuclear family is much greater to those who actually hold
the power within it. Despite the discourse of gender equality, the nuclear family continues to
be a patriarchal institution with parents remaining in their gender traditional roles. See, e.g.,
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALIY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORcE REFOIM 25 (1991) (discussing how the traditional model is now hidden behind the
"best interests of the child" argument) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQuALrrY].
27. SeeFINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 178. Fineman states:
[T~he prevailing presumption ... is that the absence of a father creates a void, one
that is appropriately filled by the state - by the bureaucrats who populate the many
institutions, including legal ones, that deal with single mothers. Here, intervention
and supervision are the norms, not privacy and the presumption of adequacy.
Id.
28.

See APRIL MARTIN, THE LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING HANDBOOK: CREATING AND

RAISING OUR FAMILIES 86-87 (1993), cited in Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers.. . and a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 23-24 (1996) (noting that lesbian families use anonymous sperm donors in artificial insemination as protection
from a future claim by the donor of parental rights over the child); see also Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers, supranote 12, at 459 (discussing a model of parenthood inclusive of nontraditional families, to which Bernstein replies).
29. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 54 (suggesting that these critiques simply create their
own model different from the traditional family model).
30. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 54.
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rethink the essence of the family in ways that address the defects of
the ideology of exclusivity while preserving self-determination and
appropriate levels of authority within the core family units.31 Author
Martha Fineman, for example, conceptualizes this core family unit
sphere as restricted in scope, consisting of the dependent-caretaker
relationship.!2 Her vision would empower the core unit at the outset,
and is consistent with a concept of the family that recognizes the
benefits of more inclusive notions of family and connections with the
3
community
There are a number of examples of the way this might work and
some indications exist that some judges are already finding informal
ways of achieving Fineman's notion. 4 In one matter before a family
court,5 a grandmother applied to have a temporary custody order
made permanent. A twelve year-old girl lived with her grandmother
for most of her life. Her mother had a history of problems that rendered her parental role sporadic, and the child was doing well with
the grandmother. Interestingly, the court declined to make the order permanent because it would have effectively severed the already
strained relationship between the mother and daughter. Rather, the
judge extended the temporary order and mandated counseling for
the mother and daughter. The decision recognized that, while there
was no question the daughter needed to remain with her grandmother, it was also important for the sake of the daughter to try to
31. The extent to which the family should be able to resist intervention from, and control
by, the outside world is controversial. For example, it is one thing to say that a single mother
with custody should have the ultimate authority to decide what school her child goes to or to
allow the child to go on a particular school trip. It is another to say that violence within that
unit should be tolerated.
32. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 234-35 (explaining that the
dependent-caretaker relationship is not an egalitarian relationship, rather it is one that should
be relatively insulated from state intervention and from others outside the dependent-caretaker
relationship). Fineman's vision of the family unit is not the traditional nuclear family, although
it could qualify.
33. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 14, at 234-35 (noting that the family
unit could include, but is not limited to, the traditional nuclear family members). The family
unit could also include an elderly parent cared for by an adult child, infants cared for by
grandmothers, or someone terminally ill with AIDS being cared for by a partner. See also Martha A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181
(1995) (discussing "the schizophrenic nature of the interaction between social ideals and empirical observations concerning dependency") (hereinafter Fineman, MaskingDependency].
34. A key aspect of Fineman's model is that only the primary caretaker has legal authority.
Fineman sees the egalitarian, authority-sharing model as one which is likely to mask continuing
patriarchal patterns of authority within the family. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra
note 14, at 22 (discussing the nature of the patriarchal ideology); FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALrTY, supranote 26, at 82 (citing the traditional doctrine that grants fathers "ownership" of
their children).
35.
Alan Lerner, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, furnished this example
used for illustrative purposes only.
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salvage or establish a mother-daughter relationship 6 In this way, the
stability of the child-grandmother relationship (the core unit) was
protected, but another important relationship was simultaneously encouraged.
The disengagement of the ideology of exclusivity from the nuclear
family in the foregoing manner carries an additional benefit. Once
non-traditional and traditional units are assured of a certain level of
authority and autonomy, the incentive to resist the development or
maintenance of supplementary relationships with others, such as
non-custodial fathers, 7 or sperm donors in some cases, is likely to
evaporate. This Article suggests that this is good in and of itself, as it
would foster a multiplicity of relationships between children and
people who, while not being parents in the full sense, can make positive contributions as members of the child's community.
C. New Reproductive Technologies:Another Challenge to the Ideology of
Exclusivity
New Reproductive Technologies ("NRTs") 3 8 provide much of the
fodder for current controversy over family and "family values." An
important issue is the establishment of legal parentage or filiation
when a child is created through the use of various reproductive technologies. 39 Within the current and traditional legal framework, establishing legal parentage is an exclusive, 4 as much as an inclusive, exercise. For example, the legal framework eliminates certain players
from recognition as much as it identifies those with legal status as
parents.
Moreover, it usually writes the "losers" out of the family
picture completely. Complex scenarios are already part of present
reproductive reality: A and B as ovum and sperm donors, C as a gesta36. The grandmother in this case believed that it was important for her granddaughter to
have a relationship with her mother. She was happy with this result because it maintained the
status quo and, thereby, preserved the stability that she had provided for her granddaughter.
37. For example, a non-custodial father would be the biological father where the stepfather adopted the child.
38. See Wendy Dullea Bowie, Comment, Multiplication andDivision-New Math for the Courts:
New Reproductive Technologies CreatePotentialLegal Time Bombs, 95 DicK. L. REV. 135, 181 (1990)
(stating that new reproductive technologies encompass the medical techniques of artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization, gamete intra-fallopian transfers, and donated gametes and
embryos).
39. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 29 (noting that filiation is a prerequisite to visitation
rights).
40. Exclusive refers to a "traditional family," such as one with a mother and a father.
41. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 32 (noting that the court must actually declare the biological father by a court to have custodial rights to the child). While this might seem "forbidding," courts often recognize that "[p]arenthood is a bundle of rights, and courts are able to
divide the bundle." Id.at 2.
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tional surrogate, D as her husband, and E and F as the commissioning infertile couple who plan to raise the child. Johnson v. Calved'2
triggered an avalanche of academic response and criticism. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of California upheld the trial court's decision.' Popular response has been to either frame the issue in terms
of whether the decision that Crispina Calvert was the legal mother
was the "right" decision," or focus on the case as a manifestation of
the evils of NRTs, one of which is the tendency to undermine natural
reproduction and the family.45 These critiques miss the mark. In
condemning NRTs as revolutionary and destructive of the "natural"
family, these arguments fail to consider the increasingly recognized
reality that the nuclear family paradigm is deeply flawed 6
NRTs, whether we like them or not, are social phenomena that
stretch our traditional notions about reproduction, child-bearing,
child-rearing, and those who participate in this process.4 7 NRTs are
42. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a husband and wife were the legal parents of a
child born of a woman in whom the couple's fertilized egg were implanted, and not the surrogate birth mother). In Calvert, the Calverts wished to have a child. However, a hysterectomy
left Mrs. Calvert with the capacity to produce eggs, yet incapable of carrying a child to birth.
Thus, the married couple eventually entered a contract with AnnaJohnson to carry the baby to
term. Subsequently, the parties began to disagree over the failure of the surrogate to disclose
her medical history and the surrogate's claim that the Calverts failed to provide adequate support. These arguments ultimately led to a lawsuit, with each side declaring parental rights. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that the Calverts were the child's genetic, biological, and natural parents. Therefore, the court effectively distinguished the gestational mother's
right to the child. Id. at 778.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Place, GestationalSurrogacy and the Meaning of "Mother":Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (CaL 1993), 17 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL" 907, 908 (1994) (stating that the
California Supreme Court was asked to resolve the issue of whether the child's mother was the
genetic or gestational mother); Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, ParentalRights and Gestational Surrogacy: An Argument Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 525, 549 (1992)
(discussing suggestions on how to expand society's notions of family beyond that of the traditional heterosexual two-parent family).
45. Another important concern is the potential exploitation of the women who serve as
surrogates or egg donors. For a strong critique of surrogacy, see MARTHA A, FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 25 (1988) (noting that one argument against
surrogacy is that it exploits both egg donors and surrogates).
46. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supranote 14, at 27, 113, 150-57 (discussing the
recent movement away from traditional family models). See generally COONTZ, supra note 20
(analyzing the transformation of the American family and the decline of the traditional nuclear
family). In addition to being based on myth, the nuclear family paradigm has excluded many
constructive family units from consideration as "family." For example, while a great deal of attention is paid to the rate of illegitimacy within the African-American community, little attention is paid to the support structures frequently provided by grandmothers and other members
of the extended families and the community. See Sault, supra note 5, at 406 (referring to African-American families as "[t] he best documented example of child sharing").
47. SeeJanet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 473, 475 (1996) (stating that reproductive technology brought a
new challenge by questioning the biological, as well as the social, correlates of family relationships, and thus magnified earlier disruptions of changing familiar assumptions about the family); Andrea E. Stumpe, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrixfor New Reproductive Technologies,

Summer 1998]

RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY

515

not alone in challenging these traditions. The focus on identifying
the "real," or legal parents is analogous to legal parentage issues in
the context of the roles of stepparents or natural fathers after adoption, or of birth mothers who want to retain some contact after giving
up a child for adoption.4 NRTs are part of current social developments that are challenging fundamental assumptions about the family.49 Social change is already well under way, although the law has
been slow in recognizing these changes. For this reason, this Article
argues that NRTs are not revolutionary in terms of their effects on
the family, but simply add to the mounting evidence in favor of a reconceived, and more inclusive legal notion of family."
This Article is not a defense of NRTs. There are many very good
reasons to be concerned about the proliferation of NRTs, the best
ones having to do with potential exploitation of reproduction and
children.' However, people concerned about NRTs are frequently
the same people who believe that the nuclear family paradigm is
threatened. In this sense, NRTs may be seen as one more nail in the
coffin of the nuclear family myth as the central paradigm of the family in North America.
D. Toward An Inclusive Vision ofFamily
A more inclusive notion of family does not mean simply adding to
the number of "parents" which law and society recognize. The challenge is to approach the task with a greater degree of imagination, so
that different types and degrees of contribution and potential contribution may be fostered.52 It also means challenging the nuclear fam96 YALE Lj. 187, 187-88 (1986) (proposing a comprehensive legal matrix to accommodate shifting parental rights and obligations in this rapidly changing area of family law).
48. See Place, supra note 44, at 907 (discussing the case of Baby M. in which the birth
mother fought for custody of her child even though she relinquished her parental rights in the
surrogacy contract).
49. See Dolgin, supranote 47, at 475 (noting how NRTs questioned the biological and social correlates of family relationships and changed old familial assumptions about the family).
50. See Fineman, MaskingDependency,supranote 33, at 2181 (noting that another challenge
to the nuclear family's exclusivity is society's continued adherence to an unrealistic and unrepresentative set of assumptions about the family which affects the way we perceive and attempt to
solve persistent problems of poverty and social welfare).
51. See Dolgin, supra note 47, at 475-76 (arguing that courts' confusion over disputes arising out of NRTs ultimately leads to arbitrary decisions claiming that the best interests of the
child are being served).
52. See Holmes, supra note 8, at 393. Holmes suggests a two-part test for identifying parentlike figures where a parent-like individual is:
(1) an individual who has (a) participated in the act or decision to create a family unit
that included the child; or (b) executed a written acknowledgment of the child or had
his or her name placed on the birth certificate of the child; or (c) executed an irrevocable written provision for the child's future and, (2) who has (a) lived with the child
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ily as the superior and "normal" family paradigm. This Article is concerned with the paradigm of the exclusive family more than the nuclear family. As discussed above, it is possible to imagine a nontraditional family unit, such as a lesbian couple, which could be as
exclusive of others as a traditional nuclear family. In the context of
NRTs, however, there is frequently a traditional unit in the form of a
married couple who wants a child. The issue that arises is whether
there may be a role for the contributors, such as the woman who
gives her baby up for adoption, the woman who contributes her ova,
or the woman who gestates the child 3
No discussion of the exclusive framework of the family is possible
or complete without considering the views of author Katharine
Bartlett. 4 After noting that an increasing number of children do not
live in traditional nuclear families, Bartlett argues that children who
live in non-traditional families often form attachments to adults outside the nuclear family, including stepparents, foster parents, and
other caretakers. 5 Bartlett challenges the exclusive view of parenthood, and takes issue with the law's failure to recognize the relationships that form outside the exclusive family. 6
However, there are two issues with respect to which Bartlett and
this Article diverge. First, Bartlett sees the nuclear family as "[a] fundamental premise of the law of exclusive parenthood .... ,, As discussed previously, some of the attributes of exclusivity, such as the
designation of the parents as those persons with "unequivocal and
while assuming daily child-rearing responsibilities for a significant period of time; or
(b) provided significant, regular support for and attempted to maintain consistent
contact with the child when continued cohabitation with the child was prevented by
the legal custodian.
Id. This is just an example of one possible way of identifying parent-like figures. This article
does not suggest an adoption of rigid tests to determine whether certain people should be recognized as part of a child's life. Indeed, the contributions that this article refers to are very diverse both in their nature, as between an anonymous donor and a surrogate mother. For example, they could be recognized through including an annual photograph to regular contact
where each satisfies different needs.
53. For the sake of this discussion, this article assumes that, as in the vast majority of cases,
gestational surrogate mothers do not change their minds and claim the child. See infra Part
IIIA (discussing the expansion of the boundaries of the exclusive family in the field of surrogacy).
54. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the NuclearFamily Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984) (discussing

the notion of parenthood as an exclusive status, and the law's recognition of only one set of
parents for a child at any one time).
55. Id at 881.
56. See id. (arguing that "[clurrent law provides virtually no satisfactory means of accommodating such extra-parental attachments.., because the presumption of exclusive parenthood requires that these relationships compete with others for legal recognition").
57. Id. at 879.
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undivided authority over [children],"" are not necessarily or logically
tied to the model of the nuclear family, although they have been traditionally. Such authority could, in principle, attach to nontraditional parents. Second, and more important, especially with respect to NRTs, Bartlett restricts her critique of the exclusive, nuclear
family to those situations where the nuclear family has broken down. 9
The problem with this is that it does not address the limitations of the
nuclear family, and it does not reflect the complex realities of families in the twentieth century. Continuing to see the nuclear family as
the norm is to continue to hold it out as the model to which all families should aspire or conform.
While many aspects of the nuclear family work for non-nuclear
families, the nuclear family norm is exclusive because it masks and
devalues the myriad of family arrangements that do not conform.
Once society separates the notion of an authoritative core of a family
unit from the notion of the nuclear family, there is no reason not to
recognize the contributions of non-nuclear families. Moreover, many
of Bartlett's arguments against exclusivity in the context of stepparents60 and unwed fathers6 ' could also apply in the context of certain
NRTs, where, depending on how one looks at the situation, there is a
unit that looks very much like a traditional nuclear family. For example, although Mary Beth Whitehead was not recognized as a legal
parent of Baby M., she obtained access rights.62
The essential normative objection to the exclusivity paradigm is
that it cuts too many players out of the picture and that it does not
reflect the multiple roles and actors involved in a child's life. In focusing on the mother and father as a unit, a myriad of other players
are written out of the script altogether. In the case of the single
mother, for example, the superiority of the nuclear family model,
combined with the exclusion of all but the members of the nuclear
family, means that the key roles played by members of the extended
58. Id. at 882.
59. See Bartlett, supra note 54, at 880-82 (challenging the law's adherence to the exclusive
view of parenthood when the premise of the nuclear family fails).
60. See Bartlett, supranote 54, at 911-19 (describing how the law has cut out unwed fathers
from a child's life).
61. Bartlett, supranote 54, at 919-28.
62. See In reBaby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1263-64 (NJ. 1988) (remanding the visitation issue to
the trial court); In re Baby M., 542 A.2d 52, 53 (NJ. Super. Ct. h. Div. 1988) (explaining the
court's decision on visitation by stating that "[tihis is no longer a termination of parental rights
or adoption case and it no longer matters how Melissa was conceived. She and her [surrogate]
mother have the right to develop their own special relationship.").
63. See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 14, at 234-35 (noting that the family
unit could include, but is not limited to, the traditional nuclear family members).
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family, such as grandmothers and uncles, are legally invisible. Yet
grandmothers and uncles can provide essential family functions."
For example, grandmothers provide a loving daycare environment,
thereby performing a parental function. 5 Similarly, it is not uncommon for uncles to take on father-like parental roles.6 Other legally
invisible extended family members include, but are not limited to,
stepparents, grandparents, 67 birth mothers, and unwed fathers.Y
Most recently, the list expanded to include surrogate mothers and
sperm donors, such as gay males who donate to enable lesbian couples to have children.
Of course, it is necessary to identify "parents" or a "core unit '70 in
order to identify family members with support obligations, testamentary issues, and decision-making authority. However, this identification should not preclude the development of supplementary roles
which could be legally recognized and which could generate significant links and support systems for children. The channeling function
of law should encourage supplementary role development.7' It is unnecessary for our notion of "legal parent" to be a win-lose, winnertake-all proposition. n

64. SeeJoan C. BohI, Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation:How PrecedentFell Prey to Sentiment
in Herndon v. Tuney, 62 Mo. L. REV. 755, 776 (1997) (stating that the family unit includes
grandparents); Alissa M. Wilson, The Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the Indian
Child Wefare Act in In re S.S. and R.S., 28 LoY. U. CHI. Lj.839, 841 (1997) (stating that grandparents, great-aunts or great-uncles, aunts or uncles, or cousins frequently raise children because of familial obligation to the extended family).
65. SeeWison, supra note 64, at 841 (discussing how Native American tribal members with
child-rearing responsibilities direct their efforts not only towards their biological children, but
also toward all tribal children).
66. Wilson, supranote 64, at 841.
67. The situation of grandparent-parent families, which cooperate to raise the children is
very common and could have been discussed at length in this article. A subsequent version of
this article includes some discussion of this growing family group. See generally Czapanskiy,
Grandparents,Parents and Grandchildren,supra note 11, at 1319 (arguing for a legal recognition
of co-parenthood rights exercisable by a parent and grandparent simultaneously in certain circumstances).
68. Stanleyv. ilinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
69. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Leckie v. Voorhies,
875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the conduct of a sperm donor and the birth
mother after the child's birth did not vitiate a waiver of the sperm donor's entitlement to assert
parental rights).
70. See Czapanskiy, Grandparents,Parentsand Grandchildren,supra note 11, at 1319 (discussing how a core unit might consist of a single parent, two parents, and/or a grandparent).
71. See Schneider, supra note 21, at 498-99 (discussing the "channeling function" of family
law).
72. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 24 (explaining a compelling account of the "all or nothing" effects of status as a legal parent).
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II. THE EXCLUSIVE FAMILY. LAW, RHETORIC, AND REALIY

This part of the Article considers distinct areas of family law, which
illustrate the tension between legal norms and changing social practices. Section A argues that the treatment of unmarried fathers and
stepparent adoptions illustrate the tenacity of an exclusive and absolute nuclear family as a matter of family law even in circumstances
where social practices have evolved to the point that the legal norms
arguably serve a non-existent reality. The treatment of the excluded
"ex-fathers" illustrates the need to recognize another sort of father or
parent who has a role but is not the ultimate decision-maker or
guardian. Section B suggests thatjoint custody provide a legal model
for recognition of different parenting roles. The Article also argues
that the problems with joint custody illustrate the need to explicitly
recognize the difficulties inherent in dividing parenting "down the
middle." This section suggests a preferable model of allocating the
ultimate responsibility to one parent, while recognizing the importance of other players, such as non-custodial parents, stepparents,
and grandparents, who may make different contributions. Section C
suggests that open adoption is a social reality that the law has only recently begun to recognize and has expanded the horizons of the family beyond the boundaries of the nuclear family.
A. Unwed Fathersand StepparentAdoptions
The history of the legal treatment of unwed fathers and of stepparent adoptions in the United States and in Canada, serves as a potent
metaphor for the exclusive family. In particular, the aforementioned
areas underline the legal imperative that a child has two parents and
cannot have more than two. The "third" parent, typically the natural
father, is excluded as a legal parent and from any entitlement to a
present or future role in the child's life.u As Bernstein notes, genetic
fathers often claim legal parentage not because they want the authority or status of full parents, but because they want the possibility of
playing some role in the child's life.74
73. Manyjurisdictions provide for judicial discretion to permit access to fathers, but a review of the cases suggests that this is infrequently granted. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 135-36 (1989) (affirming the California Court of Appeals decision not to allow visitation by
the natural father and stating that the CAUFORNIA CIV. CODE § 4601 provided that "a court
(could], in its discretion, grant 'reasonable visiting rights... to any... person having an interest in the welfare of the child,'"); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 818-19
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the California statutory scheme precluded Michael H. from
rebutting the presumption that a husband who was not sterile was the father of the child, because such rebuttal was dependent on the mother's cooperation and the rebuttal refutes the
State's interest in upholding the integrity of the matrimonial family).
74. SeeBernstein, supranote 28, at 30, 44-45 (stating the possibility that gay parents may be
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The law, however, provides no half-way house, thus creating an incentive for some to claim recognition as legal Farents. One is either
a legal parent, or one is, in effect, a stranger. This problem bears
particular relevance to the situation with NRTs. As more people contribute to the creation of a human being, more people have claims
analogous to those often made, for example, by absentee fathers. Absentee fathers have not established real relationships with the children they fathered, but who wish to retain at least the possibility of
some contact with their children in the future. For this reason, it will
be instructive to consider the treatment of unwed fathers and stepparent adoptions by the courts.
1. United States Supreme Court Cases
This section considers a few significant American cases that deal
with the treatment of unwed fathers and stepparent adoptions. Although United States courts tend to frame the right to visitation in
constitutional terms, these cases are nonetheless relevant to the Canadian context because they reveal the problems that result from an
all-or-nothing approach. The line of cases beginning with Stanley v.
Illinois? and ending with Michael H. v. Gerald D.,77 inspired much
commentary, much of which concerns reconciling apparent inconsistencies.78

willing to innovate child-raising arrangements). This is also true in Canada. See, e.g., JJ.M. v.
S.D.L. [1993] R.F.L.3d 400, 409 (N.S.S.CA.D.) (discussing the case of a natural father who was
not seeking to have custody of the child, but simply to maintain contact); Re British Columbia
Birth Registration No. 86-09-038808 [1990] R.F.L.3d 203 (B.C.S.C.) (noting that "the adoption
is not seriously opposed and that the real issue is whether K. [the natural father] should have
access to the child").
75. SeeJJ.M v. S.D.L. [1993] R.F.L.3d 400,409 (N.S.S.CA.D.).
76. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (finding that a state statute violated due process because the statute declared an unwed father unfit without a hearing). See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121
(holding that California statute creating a presumption that a child born to a married woman
living with her husband is the child of the marriage did not violate natural father's procedural
due process rights or substantive due process rights); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265
(1983) (holding that where the biological father had never established a substantial relationship with his child, the failure to give him notice of pending adoption proceedings did not deny
the father due process or equal protection since he could have requested notice); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (discussing a New York statute which gave the unwed
mother, but not the unwed father, the right to withhold adoption consent and finding that a
mother's relationship with the child could not be characterized as closer than the father); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (refusing to extend constitutional protection to unwed
fathers on the basis of biological paternity alone).
77. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
78. SeeJanet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:JudicialAssumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REV.
637, 654 (1993) [hereinafter Dolgin,Just a Gene].
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a. Stanley v. Illinois
In Stanley, Peter Stanley lived with his children and their mother,
Joan Stanley, on an intermittent basis for eighteen years.79 When she
died, an Illinois law, which presumed unwed fathers to be unfit, required the State to take the children as wards."' This law failed to
provide a hearing to determine the father's parental fitness."' The
Court held that the statute deprived Stanley of his Constitutional
rights of Due Process and Equal Protection.82 The Court emphasized,
as Dolgin notes, the importance of Stanley's position as a biological
and social father to his children. What the Court did not resolve,
however, was the independent legal significance of biological paternity. For the purposes of this Article, Stanley's significance lies merely
in the fact that it was the first in this line of cases, as there was no issue of "choosing" one father over another.
b. Quilloin v. Walcott
The issue in Quilloin v. Walcot 4 was the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that accorded all unwed mothers, but only certain unwed
fathers,85 the right to veto the adoption of their children. 8 In Quilloin, the child's mother and father had never lived together.87 Leon
Quilloin had offered only irregular child support, although he had
visited the child many times.8e The mother had married Randall Walcott when the child was almost three years old, and Walcott, the
child's stepfather, sought to adopt the child. 9 In this case, the Court
upheld the statute, refusing to extend constitutional protection .to
unwed fathers on the basis of biological paternity alone. 9 The Court
expressed concern with the absence of any substantial relationship

79. Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 646-47.
82. Id. at 657-58.
88. See Dolgin, Just a Gene, supra note 78, at 650 (explaining how the father's role influenced the Court's decision).
84. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
85. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 249 (1978) (summarizing Georgia law, which in
part stated that an unved father must obtain a court order legitimizing the child born out of
wedlock).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 247.
88. Id. at 256.
89. Id.at551.
90. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
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between Quilloin and the child.9'
This decision illustrates both the exclusive nature of legal parentage and the way that it is marshaled to serve the traditional nuclear
family. As Dolgin astutely observes:
IT] he Court was at least equally concerned with the absence of a
family unit including Quilloin, his child, and the child's mother, as
it was with the absence of a social relationship between Quilloin
and his child per se. The result of the adoption [by the child's
stepfather] in this case, wrote the Court, is to give full recognition
to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except the appellant. The Court's language about fathers
who accept significant responsibility regarding the socialization of
their children seemed to distinguish Quilloin from separated or divorced fathers who once had a relationship with their children's
mothers,
and who had once joined in a family unit with their chil92
dren.

The assumption is that the success and integrity of the new family
unit depends on the complete exclusion of other potential parents.
Of course, the "flip-side" to this dilemma is that the stepparent, in the
absence of legal adoption, is a legal stranger to the child. This status
serves to some extent as an impetus for adoption. However, the consequences of the "all-or-nothing" framework that excludes one or the
other parent may have tragic consequences for the child. As Bartlett
notes:
[T]his legal failure may be particularly tragic if the stepfamily later
dissolves. A stepparent who has served as a father for several years
may suddenly be nothing more, legally, than a stranger to the
child. Alternatively, if the natural father's rights have been terminated in order to give parenting status to the stepparent, and if the
dissolution of the stepfamily causes the stepfather to lose all interest in the child, the child may have a legal father who does not care
for him and a natural father whom he cannot reach.94

91. Id.

92. Dolgin,Justa Gene, supranote 78, at 654 (citing Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255) (alteration in
original).
93. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing a surrogacy situation in which the marriage of the contracting couple ended, causing the
surrogate mother to claim legal parentage in the child). It appears that she had a change of
heart with respect to her decision to give the child to the contracting couple because she feared
that the child she had carried for the couple would not have a stable home, or worse, would not
be wanted anymore. Divorce is more, not less, likely in subsequent marriages, with the presence of children from the earlier marriage as an added risk factor. Bartlett, supra note 54, at
918.
94. Bartlett, supranote 54, at 918.
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c. Caban v. Mohammed
In Caban v. Mohammed, 5 a stepfather, Kazin Mohammed, petitioned the New York Surrogate Court for adoption of his wife's children who were born out of wedlock.96 The New York statute at issue
gave the unwed mother, but not the unwed father, the right to withhold adoption consent.97 The Supreme Court overturned the lower
court's grant of adoption based on intermediate scrutiny of the father's Equal Protection rights. 8 The Court ruled that the state's interest in "providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate children" did
not outweigh the father's interest.9 The Court also found that a
mother's relationship with her children could not be generally characterized as closer than the father's relationship with the children.l °
Once again, the Court made its decision by the framework of exclusivity, but this time the legal stranger was the stepfather. This result, in general, is much less "exclusive" in practice, because the stepfather is likely to have, de facto, considerable involvement in the daily
life of the child, while the natural father may have entitlements ranging from occasional access to joint custody. The child is less likely,
acordingly, to be severed from a valuable or potentially valuable relationship. Nevertheless, the absence of any legal recognition of the
stepparent illustrates the failure of the legal framework to recognize
the complex realities of current familial arrangements that call for
the creation of a greater variety of legal roles. 10'
Caban also illustrates the relationship between the framework of
exclusivity and the nuclear family. As Dolgin argues, the thread that
links this line of cases together is the "natural family." Dolgin argues,
[0] nce again, in Caban the Court in large part rested the unwed father's relation to his children and his claims to legal paternity on
the father's relation to his children's mother - on the creation of
a "natural family" - as much as on the father's relationship with

95. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
96. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,384 (1979).
97. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). The statute stipulated that consent
for adoption shall be required of the adopted child; of the parents or surviving parent, whether
adult or infant; of a child born in wedlock; of the mother, whether adult or infant; of a child

born out of wedlock; and of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the adoptive child. Id.
98. Caban,441 U.S. at 394.
99. Idat391.
100. Id. at 388-89.
101. A friend of mine is a stepmother of teenage children whose mother died. Her husband is frequently out of the country, and she has been repeatedly frustrated with difficulties
arising over permission to go on school trips or to obtain a learner's driving permit, etc.
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his children, per se.
The framework of exclusivity is, in effect, a protective wall which
the law constructs around the unit that it considers as the superior
and fundamental social unit: the nuclear (or natural) family. The essential function or attribute of exclusivity is the ability to control the
unit and to resist influence from the outside, whether from the state
or legal strangers. But, as I suggested above, and as I will discuss further below, some of these attributes of exclusivity, such as ultimate
decision-making authority over schools or medical decisions, are not
necessarily tied to the traditional nuclear family and could also be accorded to non-traditional family units.
d. Lehr v. Robertson
Lehr v. Robertson13 is another example of an unwed father and stepfather adoption case. 1 4 As an unwed father, Jonathan Lehr was not
entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding enacted by his child's
mother and her husband. 5 Lehr argued that the Court denied him
Due Process and that the differential treatment in the statute denied
him Equal Protection.0 6
The Supreme Court rejected Lehr's
claims.0 7 Although the Court recognized an unwed father may deserve protection in some cases, a mere biological connection did not
establish legal paternity. 08 Lehr's Equal Protection argument failed
because he had not established a "substantial relationship" with his
daughter, while the mother had established such a relationship with
their daughter.' 9
The simple understanding of this case is that constitutional protection of legal paternity requires a commitment to fatherhood evidenced by the establishment of a significant relationship with the
child."0 Dolgin notes that the mother of his child hid the child from
Lehr who "never ceased his efforts to locate" the mother and the
child. "' However, when Lehr located his child and her mother, the

102. Dolgin,Just a Gene, supranote 78, at 657.
103. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
104. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 248 (1983).
105. Id at 264-65.
106. Id. at 248.
107. I
108. Id. at 261.
109. Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983).
110. See Dolgin, Just a Gene, supranote 78, at 662 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 436 U.S. 248,
269 (1983) (White,J, dissenting) and noting that this is sometimes problematic as in Lehr).
111. DolginJust a Gene, supranote 78, at 662.
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child's mother threatened to2 have Lehr arrested if he attempted to
make contact with his child.1

By way of comparison, the Canadian case J.M. v. S.D.L.11 dealt
with a father appealing a decision that dispensed his right to consent
to an adoption proceeding for his child." 4 The court allowed the father's appeal, and the court dismissed both the application to dispense with consent, and the application for adoption."- Judge
Roscoe was sensitive to the fact that the mother did not cooperate
with the father's access schedule, and that if the adoption was
granted she and her husband would not allow the biological father
access to the child.
In addition, the judge specifically stated that
the solid family unit created by the mother and her husband would
continue to enhance the welfare of the child even if the adoption was
not granted. Although in this case the judge did not give weight to
the argument of the mother and her husband that the visits of the father would threaten their family unit, it is very obvious from the facts
that the mother and her husband did feel threatened.118
These details further illustrate the consequences of the framework
of exclusivity. The child's mother, in having to choose between the
father as a legal parent or a legal stranger, naturally preferred legal
recognition.
The existence of joint custody presumptions (or
"friendly parent" rules) in many jurisdictions may render the option
even more stark. 9 The mother can raise the child as she sees fit,
without having to deal with what may be destructive interference and
possible dissension over issues ranging from the choice of religion
and schools, to medical treatment and disciplinary issues. Otherwise,
112. See Dolgin,Just a Gene, supra note 78, at 662; see also Woodhouse, supranote 5, at 180506 (observing Lehr to set up the framework of rights to children that "obscures actual fathering
of them," and that Lehr's conduct prior to Jessica's birth as "a clear example of functional gestational fathering").
113.
114.
115.
116.

[1993] RF.L.3d 400 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
Id.
Id.
Id

117. Id. at 402, 409.
118. SeeJ.JM., [1993] R.F.L.3d at 408 (stating that, in fact, the custodial parent and his or
her spouse articulate various reasons as to why adoption by the stepparent should be permitted
by a court). Some of those reasons are: the child's surname is different from the rest of the
family; if the custodial parent is the mother; the child needs some sort of symbolic process to
prove that he really belongs to the new family; difficulties with succession; the presence of the
non-custodial parent causes difficulties for the child or the new family unit. Citing Paula Barran Weiss, The Misuse of Adoption by the Custodial Parent and Spouse, 2 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
FAMILY LAW [CAN.J. FAm. L.] 141, 156 (1979), reprinted in CANADIAN CHILDREN'S LAW: CASES,
NOTES AND MATERIALS 327, 329 (Nicholas Bala et al. eds., 1982)).
119. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1997) (stating that there is a presumption that
joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child).
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she can be one of two full legal parents sharing the parental role with
her former spouse. The incentive is clear.
In the Canadian case of Re British Columbia Birth RegistrationNo. 8609-038808,20 Judge Lamperson found that continued contact between the father and the child would be beneficial for the child.'
However, the mother and her husband wanted the father out of their
lives. The child had been born following a casual relationship between the mother and father.'2 The mother then married another
man. After her marriage, she and her husband stopped the father's
access to the child. The judge granted the adoption and reluctantly
denied access to the father because he found such hostility towards
the father on the part of the mother and her husband. He feared
that continuing contact could be detrimental to the child.'2 Once
again, it is clear that the mother and her husband did not want the
father to disrupt the family unit that they had created. The judge's
comments with respect to the mother and her husband's attitude
were as follows:
[I] t is evident, however, that it is they who cannot cope with K. [the
father] visiting the child. They find his visits disruptive to their relationship. Both of them admit to arguing with one another about
K and say that they find the situation to be very emotional. Although they have advanced reasons as to why K's visits to the child
are detrimental, I find those to be mostly rationalizations designed
to advance their case. The fact is that they want K. out of their lives
once and12for
all and that this has nothing to do with the welfare of
4
the child.
An alternative framework that provides a modified role for the father would bolster the mother's role as primary caretaker without
threatening her position. In the absence of the "all or nothing
framework" mothers would have less incentive to obliterate fathers
from the picture entirely. This point is broadly relevant, not only to
the case of unwed fathers/stepparent adoptions, but also to postdivorce custody issues and NRTs.
e. MichaelH. v. GeraldD.
The final case in the unwed father line of Supreme Court decisions

120. [1990] R.F.L.3d 203 (B.C.S.C.).
121. Re British Columbia Buth Registration No. 86-09-038808

(B.C.S.C.).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 204.

[1990] R.F.L.3d 203

Summer 1998]

RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY

527

is Michael H v. Gerald &
D. 2 Gerald D. and Carole D. were married in
1976.6 In 1978, Carole became involved with a neighbor, Michael H.
This relationship continued over the next few years, although Carole
and Gerald remained married. 7 In 1981, Carole gave birth to Victoria, and her husband Gerald's name was listed on the birth certificate
as father. 121 Shortly after the birth, however, Carole informed Michael that she suspected he was the father. 12 When Gerald moved to
New York in late 1981, Carole stayed in California where she and Michael had blood tests taken of themselves and Victoria, which showed
2 '
a 98.07% probability that Michael was the father."
Gerald always held Victoria out as his child, but following his move
to New York, Carole and Victoria spent extended periods of time with
Michael during which Michael held Victoria out as his child."' There
were periods of reconciliation with Gerald, and periods of months
during which she and Victoria lived with Michael. Ultimately, in
1984, Carole reconciled with Gerald in New York. By this time, as
Justice Scalia noted in his opinion for the Court, Victoria had "found
herself within a variety of quasi-family units 112 for the first three years
of her life. As Justice White noted in his dissent: "There is a personal
and emotional relationship between Michael and Victoria, who grew
up calling him 'Daddy.' Michael held Victoria 33
out as his daughter
and contributed to the child's financial support.',1
Michael H. filed a filiation action to establish his paternity and
right to visitation.2 It appears that his central concern was not to attain recognition as a full legal parent but simply to obtain visitation
rights. 3 ' The only way to establish primafacieentitlement to visitation
under California law was to establish paternity.
Thus, Michael H.
was, in effect, forced to assert a claim larger than he really wanted.
125. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
126. Id. at 113.
127. Id.
128. I- at 114.
129. Id
130. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
131. I132. Id.
133. See id. at 159 (White,J, dissenting).
134. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114; see alsoVincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 4601 (West 1989) and illustrating that although California law provides that the court "may" grant visitation rights to "any person having an interest
in the welfare of a child," case law indicates that pursuant to this section, absent legal paternity,
visitation should be denied when it is against the wishes of the mother).
135. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 119.
136. See id at 117 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 4601 (West 1989)).
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Interestingly, Justice Scalia noted that the "immediate benefit" sought
by Michael H. was visitation, but went on to express some concern
that "if Michael were successful in being declared the father, other
lights would follow - most importantly, the right to be considered as
the parent who should have custody."13 7 His paternity action was denied on the basis of the California "marital presumption" statute."
In the i s9eyes of the plurality, his visitation claim rested on his paternal
status.

Michael H. and Victoria, through a guardian ad litem, appealed on
the basis that the marital presumption violated their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection.14 The Supreme Court, in
a five to four decision, affirmed the lower court decisions upholding
the marital presumption and the denial of visitation.1 41 Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion is a ringing endorsement of both the vision of the
traditional family as a "good" which the law properly protects, and
137. See id. at 118-19 (citing CAL.

Ciw. CODE § 4600) (West 1989) which describes custody as

a status that:
[E]mbrace[s] the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including the child's care; the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to direct
the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, education, and
health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare the child for additional obligations, which includes the teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship.
Id (alteration in original).
138. SeeMichaelH., 491 U.S. at 118 (concluding that the conditions qualifying the presumption were not satisfied by the facts); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989) (providing that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage"). The conditions to qualify for the presumption were held not to have been satisfied on the facts. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 118.
139. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (denying Michael's
motion for continued visitation pending the appeal under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West Supp.
1989)). The statute provided the following:
[R]easonable visitation rights [shall be awarded] to a parent unless it is shown that
such visitation would be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the discretion of the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
Id. The Plurality interpreted CAL. CIV. CODE § 621 as meaning that once a paternity claim
failed, the claimant could not even claim the discretionary visitation rights as "any other person." See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 133-34 (Stevens,J., concurring) (arguing that the decision constituted "an unnatural reading of the statute's plain language, but [was] also not consistent with
the California courts' reading of the statute"); MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 148-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing constitutional issues. Justice Brennan dismissed Justice Stevens' interpretation of California case law on § 4601 as "mere wishful thinking," and argued instead that the
courts had been interpreting it in the same manner as the plurality. The statute removed not
only the possibility of establishing parental status, but also the possibility of maintaining a relationship with the child which constituted a violation of Michael's and Victoria's due process
rights.).
140. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119. But see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 135-34 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
141.

Id. at 121.
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also, more implicitly, of the utility of the exclusiveness framework as a
way to bolster and protect the traditional family. In holding that Michael H. did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
his relationship with Victoria, he rejected the argument that the earlier cases had established a liberty interest on the basis of "biological
fatherhood plus an established parental relationship - factors that exist in the present case as well."'2 The unwed father cases rested instead "upon the historic respect - indeed, sanctity would not be too
strong a term - traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary family."5' As Dolgin notes:
[T] he plurality rejected the possibility, almost without exploration,
that an unwed father and his biological child could form a "family
unit" in the absence of an appropriate relationship between the
unwed father and the child's mother. The opinion refused to include within "traditional," and thus protected, family units the "relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and
their child."' 44
The plurality opinion reveals its reliance on a very exclusive notion
of family in its outright refusal to consider the possibility that Victoria
might have two "fathers."'145 Indeed, Justice Scalia is rather dismissive
on this point, stating that "California law, like nature itself, makes no
provision for dual fatherhood," 146 a comment which seems rather
ironic given that the father whom the law identifies is not, in fact, the
"natural" or biological father at all. The use of an exclusive notion of
family as a protective shield for the traditional family was evident in
the trial judge's determination that "the existence of two fathers as
male authority figures will confuse the child and be counterproductive to her best interests."147 Although thejudge uses the "best
interests of the child" language, the cited authority rested on the notion that allowing the biological father access to the child could have
a destabilizing and disruptive influence on the legally-recognized

142. Id. at 123.
143. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123. The Plurality also rejected Victoria's claim (through her
guardian ad litem) that she had a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship with
her father. Id. Her due process claim failed on the same basis as Michael H., that he had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with Victoria. Id. at 130. The
Court affirmed the validity of the state's choice to protect the marital family. Victoria's equal
protection claim failed on related grounds. Id at 131. The Plurality held that she was legitimate in the eyes of the law; was treated as other legitimate children; and was not, therefore, denied equal treatment. Id.
144. Dolgin,Just a Gene, supra note 78, at 667.
145. MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 121.
146. Id. at 135.
147. Id. at 118.
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family unit.'
The line of cases culminating in Michael H. all involved the question of whether the statutes at issue violated constitutionally protected fights. One could argue that these cases ought to be seen as
authority for the view that the law should not embrace a broader notion of family and the roles various actors may play. All these cases
held that certain statutory schemes did not violate a father's constitutional fights by replacing one parental role with another against the
wishes of a biological father. Moreover, some cases, such as Stanley
and Quilloin, did hold that fathers' constitutional fights had been violated. This restrictive reading of the cases might allow an argument
that the law is receptive to a more inclusive and less traditional view
of the family. Such a reading does not, however, take account of the
almost fervored support for the traditional family that these cases reflect, and it is this aspect that renders them most relevant outside the
United States.
The support of the traditional family is expressed most strongly in
Michael H., but is present in all the cases. The overriding concern in
these cases is the desirability of creating or legally endorsing a "new"
family unit, and of protecting it by excluding the old father, seen as a
potentially destabililizing influence. Although the law in many jurisdictions has allowed access to "former" fathers, the provisions typically treat the father as any "other" person (meaning non-parent),
and the burden is upon the claimant to convince the court to exercise its discretion by granting access."
Very few "ex-fathers" are successful in such claims.3 0 By definition,
a court claim indicates that the mother and the "new father" object to
visitation. Usually, the courts are ready to accept the notion that the
"ex-father" is somewhat of an interloper after the adoption and
should not have access, a view that is consistent with the traditional
view of adoption.151 The courts are very willing to see the "ex-father"

148. See id. at 135 (Stevens,J., concurring).
149. But see MichaelH., 491 U.S. at 134 (stating that § 621 of the California evidentiary statute created an absolute bar to the possibility that a person in Michael's position could prove
that he is "another person having an interest in the welfare of the child" to whom "reasonable
visitation rights" may be awarded under § 4601).
150. See generally Dolgin,Just a Gene, supranote 78, at 649-59 (discussing the development of
the Supreme Court's attitude toward a biological father's relationship to his child). Dolgin believes that even in cases where the Court recognized comparable relationships of biological
mothers and fathers to the child, the more significant factor was the child's relationship to the
biological mother. Id.
151. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Post Adoption Visitation by Natural Parent,78
A.L.RL 4th 278 (1991) (discussing post-adoption visitation rights).
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as a threat to the stability of the new unit. 52 However, this is out of
step with the modem (or "post-modem") treatment of the typical
family after divorce. In most of those cases,joint custody is frequently
presumed and the argument of a mother that her ex-husband's visitation is disruptive to her new marriage is not likely to get her very
far.' 5 Of course, in the former cases, the first unit was not traditional
in the sense that, as Dolgin correctly emphasizes," the father did not
have a marriage-like relationship with the mother.
When a marriage-like relationship existed, the judicial treatment
(as cases like Stanley and Caban illustrate) is much more similar to
that accorded to post-divorce families. This is also true in Canada,
but to a lesser absolute extent. Judges in Canada do not necessarily
equate adoption by a stepparent with absence of access for the father.'5 Several cases seem to recognize the interests of the father in
maintaining his relationship with the child. 6 In Adoption of Male InSeaton commented:
fant,5 1Judge
[I] n my view, the tie with a parent with access should not bar a
child from being made a member of a new family through adoption, nor should a child being adopted by one of his parents and
that parent's spouse be cut off from his other parent if that tie is
useful to him. It would be wrong to have to choose between adoption and access where both might be in the best interests of the
child, and the law does not force that choice on the court. 5
The cases pay attention to factors such as the relationship between
the father and the child, the regularity of the exercise of access by the
father, and the payment of maintenance. 9 These factors influence
the courts in deciding whether adoption and access should be

152. Dolgin,Just a Gene, supranote 78, at 665-71.
153. Cf Margaret Martin Barry, The District of Columbia'sJoint Custody Presumption:Misplaced
Blame and Simplistic Solutions, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 767 (1997) (discussing the District of Columbia's presumption in favor ofjoint custody).
154. Dolgin,Just a Gene, supranote 78, at 654-55, 668, 670.
155. See cases cited infra note 156.
156. See, e.g., D.(R.) v. S.(W.B.) [1991] R.F.L.3d 1 (B.C.CA.); ReAdoption of Male Infant
No. 78-08-022716, No. CA004111 [1986] B.CJ. QUICK LAW 251 (B.C.C.A-); Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 86-09-038808 [1990] R.F.L.3d 203 (B.C.S.C.) (refusing to grant access
to the father only because of the hostility of the mother and her husband); W. v. C. [1982]
ONTARIO REPoRTs.2d [O.R.2d] 730, 737 (Ont. Prov. C. Fain. Div.) (granting an application by
the natural mother and her husband to dispense with the requirement that the natural father
consent to adoption, but expressing hope and recommending that the proposed adoptive parents would permit a continuation of reasonable visitation by the natural father and his mother).
157. [1986] B.C.J. QUICKLAW 251.
158. Adoption of Male Infant [1986] B.CJ. Quick Law 251.
159. Seecases cited supranote 156.
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granted at all, in light of the best interests of the child.1 6
In the context of stepparent adoptions, an obvious suggestion is
that the "ex-father" should have a presumptive entitlement to access,
rather than having to convince the court, as a legal stranger to the
child, that he should be given access. Michael H. was apparently not
seeking to usurp Gerald D.'s role as the primary father. He merely
wanted to maintain contact and, in order to establish visitation rights,
the legal framework required that he establish filiation.16' The possibility of a more moderate claim to access could deflate such situations. As things stood, Gerald and Carole had the choice between
having Michael H. recognized as a full parent to the exclusion of
Gerald D., or of resisting any entitlements at all. It is not terribly surprising that they chose the latter course. The all-or-nothing framework may force people to take stronger positions than they really
want to take. Justice Scalia certainly saw the choice in stark terms:
[H]ere, to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to
deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa. If Michael has a
"freedom not to conform" (whatever that means), Gerald must
equivalently have a "freedom to conform." One of them will pay a"
price for asserting that "freedom" - Michael by being unable to

act as father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by
being unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional family unit

he [sic] and Victoria have established."'
The possibility of certain access rights, which are disengaged from
the status of recognition as the "parent(s)" in the full sense, could
remove this impasse. 163 Herein lies an important analogy with issues
arising in the context of adoption, surrogacy and other NRTs.

160. See, e.g., C.(B.) v.T.(E.) [1995] WESTERN WEEKLY REPORTS [w.W.R.] 560, 562, 564-65
(Sask. Q.B. Faro. Div.); D.(R.)v. S.(W.B.) [1991] R.F.L.3d at 3-4; British Columbia Birth Registration
Re British Columbia Buth Registration No. 86-09-03880 [1990] R.F.L.3d 203-04.
161. But seeW. v. C. [1982] O.R.2d 730, 732 (describing a Canadian case in which the father
was asked by the court why he thought it would be in the best interests of the child that his consent to the adoption not be dispensed with and made it abundantly clear that his exclusive concern was the maintenance of the very limited access he had exercised).
162. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989). See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at
1857 (pointing out that from a child's perspective the matter would be presented differently).
"The question would not be whether each of the daddies in Michael H. has the right to Victoria's company but whether two daddies are better than one." Id.
163. In principle, it might even be possible to create "suspended" access rights. For example, if the court was satisfied that access would not be in Victoria's best interests at a particular
time, it might stipulate that the father could reapply later, or grant visitation to take effect at a
particular future time.
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2. Moving Away From the "All-or-Nothing"Father
Many children grow up in nontraditional families, and the families
overlap.'" Several legal structures are at odds with the new nontraditional family and continue to "channel" in favor of an obsolete
model of the family. The child should be able to enjoy the benefits
flowing from both the natural parents and the stepparent's affection. ' o In the words of one author, "family adoptions are really a perversion of the true purpose of adoption, which is to place children
without parents or unwanted children in family units.' ' "H Children in
reconstituted families frequently see themselves as having two fathers
or mothers. Research repeatedly shows that the children who are
most adjusted following divorce are those who maintain relationships
With their natural parents.6 7 Those relationships are not successive or
exclusive; the subsequent family co-exists with the former.""
Families are working out a multiplicity of relationships and roles
for all the parent-figures and extended family members.169 Our legal
framework remains detached from reality, probably because the impetus for change, at least through caselaw, tends to come from the
rare pathology of cases that are litigated. It is easy for courts to characterize cases where parents have not been married, as deviations
from the norm of the nuclear family, and as the panacea for society's
ills. 7 The link between these cases and the NRT cases lie in the fact
that the players typically include a married couple and a third person
who serves as a surrogate and/or a contributor of gametes. As discussed below, courts almost always prefer the nuclear family. Furthermore, as with the stepparent cases reviewed above, the notion
that there might be some role, albeit a qualitatively different one, for
left out "parents," is not even contemplated.
164. Kimberly P. Carr, Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child in a NontraditionalFamily,58 BROOK. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1992).
165. Alastair Bissett-Johnson, Stepparent Adoptions in English and CanadianLaw in THE CHILD
AND THE COURTS 335, 350 (Ian F.G. Baxter & Mary A. Eberts eds., 1978), cited inJ.J.M. v. S.D.L.
(1993] R.F.L.3d 400,408-09 (N.S.S.C.AD.).
166. Weiss, supranote 118, cited inJj.M. v. S.D.L. [1993] R.F.L.3d 400,408 (N.S.S.CAjD.).
167. See ELEANOR MAccOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, THE DIVIDED CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL
DILEMiiAS OF CUSTODY 277 (1992) (finding that ongoing conflict between the parents is damaging to the child, so the benefit of frequent contact in a highly conflictual situation is potentially
outweighed by the damaging effects of the conflict on the child); see also Re British Columbia
Birth Registration No. 86-09-038808 [1990] R.F.L.3d 203 (B.C.S.C.).
168. See generally Barbara L. Shapiro, Non-TraditionalFamilies in the Courts: The New Extended
Family, 11 J. Amf. ACAD. MATIuM. LAW. 117, 118 (1993) (stating that the traditional concept of
"family" has dramatically evolved over the past 25 years).
169. Shapiro, supra note 168, at 118.
170. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 111 (1989) (noting common law and
statutes leaning toward maintaining the "marital family").
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B. The Post-DivorceFamily and theJoint Custody Trend
Joint custody may be seen as an arrangement at odds with traditional visions of the family because it appears to maintain parentchild relationships in the absence of a continuing viable nuclear family.'7 ' Very often, joint custody is an arrangement that continues after
both ex-spouses formed new relationships. Judges have not shown
the concern about protecting the new unit in this context, and enthusiastically endorse joint custody1H The feminist critique of this
development is potent and fairly obvious. The discourse of equality
has fueled the fathers' rights movements and served to reinforce patriarchal ideology by undermining the power which women have traditionally had with respect to children and custody 7
There are two lessons that emerge from the rapid explosion in4
joint custody with respect to the exclusive framework of the family17
First,joint custody changed the landscape of custody and post-divorce
parenting. At the very least, it provided a legal framework that recognizes and legitimizes non-exclusive parenting. Joint custody provides one model in which parenting is shared across units or households. Moreover, these units frequently contain new spouses,'who
also play roles which are implicitly recognized in the context of custody issues."
In many jurisdictions that explicitly recognize different forms of
joint custody, the law recognizes that the parents may share in different ways. For example, joint physical custody may not involve equal
amounts of time. 76 Joint legal custody may not involve more time
171. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Dordeyn, The Parent-ChildRelationship and the Current Cycle
of Family Law Reform RethinkingJoint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. LJ. 455, 483 (1984) (stating that the
principle for resolving custody disputes may result in more joint custody arrangements, as the
traditional family model becomes less generally the norm and more families engage in shared
parenting).
172. A full critique ofjoint custody is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Alison
Harvison YoungJoint Custody as Norm: Solomon Revisited, 32 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 785 (1994).
173. See FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 26, at 73. See, e.g., MARY ANN
MASON, THE EQUALrIY TRAP (1988) (arguing againstjoint custody as the preferred solution by
legislatures); Carol Smart, Power and the Politics of Child Custody, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE
POLrCS OF GENDER 1, 8-10 (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuujsen eds., 1989) (noting how the
fathers' rights movement relies on formal law's inequality to tie them closer to the interests of
the child and concurrently usurping mothers' powers).
174. In 1991, 14% of court-determined divorce cases resulted in ajoint custody settlement,

up from 1% in 1986. See STATISTICS CANADA, WOMEN IN CANADA: A STATISTICAL REPORT 18 (3d
ed. 1995).
175. For example, the relationship that a child has with a stepparent or stepsiblings may be
factors that a court will consider if an issue arises about changing custody arrangements.
176. See Hall-Duncan v. Duncan, No. FA9501450815, 1998 WL 13876 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan.
12, 1998) (discussing the plaintiffs Civil Custody of the triplets for 30% or 38% of the time);
Burke v: Burke, 667 N.E. 2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (discussing respondent's custody of the
child alternating weekends and every Wednesday after school until Thursday morning).
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than the traditional "reasonable access." Because of the level of cooperation required to make it work, arrangements evolve along with
the children's needs and activities. Joint custody is evidence that
more inclusive models of the family are possible and probably be successful.'"
The second lesson which emerges from joint custody is cautionary
in nature. The major problem with joint custody is that it weakens
the position of the primary caretaker, usually the mother 7
Although she is now expected to make her own way in the world economically, she risks losing her children if she accepts ajob transfer.79
Even though she may well have been the primary decision-maker during the marriage, post-divorce, she may be undermined in everything
from discipline to bedtime to education to religion. It is hardly surprising that many women opposejoint custody for these reasons.""
Arguably, joint custody has been a phenomenon that has caught
on before it has been fully thought through. For instance, while its
virtues of fostering children's relationships with their fathers have
been widely extolled, little attention has been paid to the resolution
of conflict between the ex-spouses. Few statutory schemes contemplate discord and provide for tie-breaking mechanisms. One example of a statute that does consider discord is the Manitoba, Canada,
statute that provides that the primary
caretaker will have the ultimate
8
say in the case of disagreement. 1
The CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC, Canada, is another example.

The

Code specifically provides that parents can apply to the court for a
determination of a matter concerning their child or children on
which they are unable to agree. 82 This provision is unusual because it
177. Scott & Dordeyn, supranote 171, at 472-75.
178. See Mary Becker, MaternalFeelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 183-87 (1992) (discussing problems with joint custody).
179. There are cases which force mothers to choose. See, e.g., Jones v. Jaworski [1989]
R.F.L.3d 385,396-97 (Alta. Q.B.). The opinion expressed is that:

[I]fJaworski [the mother] makes the decision to move to Ottawa it would be in the
best interests of Christopher and Michael that their ordinary residence be transferred

to their father's home.... If, as a result of this decision she elects to stay in Edmonton
then I am of the view that there is no change of circumstances sufficient to vary the existing custody arrangements. I am aware that this may now be a virtually impossible
choice forJaworski but stranger things have happened before in people's lives.
Id.
180. Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin Responsibilities,
38 UCLAL. REV. 1483, 1531 n.186 (1991).
181. Family Maintenance Act, R.S.M. ch. F-20 (1987) (Manitoba, Canada).
182. See CML CODE OF QUEBEC [C.C.Q.] art. 604. Not surprisingly, there has been very little

case law under this provision. Specific orders are, of course, made in the context of custody or
access determinations, but it seems very rare that married parents litigate with respect to what
school their child will attend. For examples of case law decided under article 604, see generally
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applies to all parents, whether they are together or not.8 3 It is also
unusual because the drafters specifically contemplated the tiebreaking problem when they began revising the Code in the 1970s to
conform to principles of spousal equality. Now, both parents retain
"autorit6 parentale,T 4 which survives divorce and custody deprivations and can only be removed for cause.' 5 This is the Quebec civil
law equivalent, in effect, to legal joint custody. Previously, the issue
never arose because, at law, the husband and father was the head of
the family. His "autorit6 paternal" subsisted even if the wife obtained
sole custody following divorce.8 6
While it is clear that more cooperation and less conflict is better for
the children involved, it is necessary to provide a realistic framework
for the resolution of disputes that arise. It is not realistic for every
disagreement to involve a trip to court. Rather, it makes much more
sense to allocate a default decision-making power to one spouse or
the other. The most satisfactory legal presumption would designate
the primary caretaker as the default decision-maker. Allocating or reallocating some essential power to women who are usually the primary caretakers' 7 should result in two consequences. First, fathers
will have some incentive to cooperater s Second, mothers will feel
Droit de la famille - 2341 [1996] RIJ.Q. 92 (C.s.) (difference of opinion between parents as to
whether a psychological or psychosocial evaluation is in the best interest of their child); Droit
de la famille - 2201 [1995] R.D.F. 417 (C.S.) (dispute between divorced parents regarding the
religious education of their children).
183. C.C.Q. art. 604.
184. Parental authority.
185. See G.C. v. T.V.F. [1987] CANADA SUPREME COURT REPORTS [S.C.R.] 244 (Can). In a
leading case that went to the Supreme Court of Canada, a father who was divorced from his
wife, and estranged from his children prior to the death of the mother challenged a custody
claim from the aunt and uncle with whom the children lived with since their mother became
ill. The father initially won the custody suit but the children kept running away and returning
to the aunt and uncle. The Court held that there was, no "cause" for depriving the father of his
parental authority and right to custody, but because it was clearly, though not the father's fault,
in the children's best interests to remain with their aunt and uncle, he was deprived of the "exercise" of his right to custody. The fact that he retained the "enjoyment" ("jouissance") of the
right meant that the door was open for him to develop a relationship with his children in the
future. It also meant that, in the event of the death of the aunt and uncle, custody would revert
to him as the legally recognized father.
186. See QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIvATE LAW 260 (J.E.C. Brierley
et al. eds., 1993).
187. There are, of course, a number of problems with the primary caretaker presumption
which have been discussed elsewhere. See MASON, supra note 173, at 35-36 (advocating a maternal presumption).
188. In mostjurisdictions in North America, custody determinations are made either on the
basis ofjoint custody presumptions or the best interests standard. Either way, this arguably has
created an incentive for fathers to use the possibility of custody claims as bargaining chips. See
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supranote 26, at 79-94; see also MASON, supra note 173, at
83. One leading study, however, failed to find empirical evidence of claims for custody as bargaining strategies. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN,supranote 167.
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more secure, and thus more likely to actively encourage relationships
to flourish without the fear that their own position will be undermined. In short, designating the primary caretaker as the default decision-maker might allow women to regain some of the losses suffered
in the last twenty years as a result of the discourse and ideology of
equality. 8 9 Joint custody arrangements could divide up parenting in
any number of ways, subject to this default position.
Post-divorce family constellations are potentially strong models for
more inclusive legal paradigms of the notion of family. Moreover,
the "new right" and so-called "family values" notwithstanding, such
alternative family formations have gained increasing acceptance,
making it easier to displace the exclusive nuclear unit as the dominant norm. In turn, these developments may facilitate the acceptance of less traditional family relationships in other contexts, such as
those involving NRTs and same-sex families.
C. Open Adoption
0°

Open adoption is another area that illustrates the disparity between law and practical reality. Many adoption arrangements have
obvious relevance for surrogacy or even gamete donation. The paradigmatic relationship is one that answers a number of concerns about
the notion of the "all-or-nothing" parent.1 There is generally no
question that the adoptive parents are the decision-makers, though in
some situations they might wish to consult the birth parent. For the
birth parent, the central concern is to maintain contact so that he or
she knows the whereabouts of his or her child. Frequently, adoptive
parents send birthday cards and photographs of the child to birth
parents.1 93 The child can be raised not only knowing that she or he
189. See FINEmAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supranote 26, at 29 (stating that "an equality
view of marriage denies the reality of many women who assume, during and after the marriage,
more than a partner's share in the conduct and burdens associated with household and child
care"); see also MASON, supranote 173.
190. See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSrRA L. REv. 1091, 1118 (1997) (stating that a new paradigm in adoption
law is open adoption, which encompasses a range of possibilities such as open records and exchange of identif)ing information to birth parents or visiting the adoptive family after adoption); Annette Baron, Ruben Pamnor & Arthur D. Sorosky, Open Adoption, 21 Soc. WORK 97
(1976) (defining open adoption as one in which birth parents meet the adoptive parents and
relinquish all legal, moral, and nurturing rights to the child, but retains the right to continuing
contact and to knowledge of the child's whereabouts).
191. See Shapo, supra note 190, at 1195 (stating that once an adoption occurs, the parental
rights of the biological parents are extinguished).
192. See Carol A. Gorenberg, Fathers'Rights vs. Children's Best Interests: Establishinga Predictable
Standardfor California Adoption Disputes, 31 FAM. L.Q. 169, 207 (1997) (discussing open adoption, where the adoptive family agrees to maintain contact with the child's biological family).
193. See id at 207 (stating that "[o]pen adoptions include awide range of options for one or
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was adopted, but knowing that the birth parent(s) may be available to
answer questions as well.14 The adoptive parents have access to inas to other matformation about their child's medical history, as 9well
5
ters that become important as the child develops.
Perhaps not coincidentally, inclusive family ties develop when the
position of the adoptive family is generally quite secure. As long as
issues of consent and relinquishment are settled, and the adoption is
formally constituted in accordance with the law, the position of the
adoptive parents is clear: they are the legal decision-makers.'
From
this relatively strong position, the adoptive parents may feel comfortable including the birth mother or father in their lives. However, it is
also important to recognize that this privilege goes both ways. The
move to open adoption has been driven by the wish of birth mothers
to play some role in the lives of their biological children 7 Although
some prospective adoptive parents may be reluctant, the scarcity of
women willing to give up their babies for adoption has strengthened
the birth mother's position in influencing the terms of the adoption
agreement. Like many men who oppose stepparent adoptions, and
like some surrogates who claim recognition as legal parents, these
birth mothers are not seeking to replace the adoptive parents but are
simply trying to establish a supplementary and complementary parental role.

two-way contact between the adoptive family and the birth parents, from simply sending annual
pictures to the birth parents to regular visitation between the birth parents and the child").
194. See Shapo, supra note 190, at 1196 (discussing the adoptive child's ability to have access
to his or her genetic history).
195. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implicationsfor Collaborative
Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997 (1995) (discussing the phenomenon of open
adoption and cautioning against defining the process of adoption as the creation of one family
and the dissolution of another). The author sees adoption as:
[A] way of providing security for and meeting the developmental needs of a child by
legally transferring ongoing parental responsibilities for that child from the birth parents to adoptive parents, and, in the process, creating a new kinship network that forever links the birth family and the adoptive family through the child who is shared by
both.
Id. See also Cynthia E. Cordle, Open Adoption: The Needfor LegislativeAction, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y &
L. 275 (1995) (advocating no particular stance on open adoption but "seeks to explore and to
clarify its legal status"); Laurie A. Ames, Open Adoptions: Truth & Consequences, 16 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 137 (1992) (clarifying the positives and negatives of open adoption); Carol Amadio &
Stuart L. Deutsh, Allowing Adopted Children to 'Stay in Touch'with Blood Relatives, 22J. FAM. L. 59
(1983) (focusing on why open adoption is desirable and the current changes in law supporting
it).
196. See generallyGorenberg,supranote 192, at 208 (reviewing legislative history).
197. See Carol Sanger, SeparatingFrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 490 (1996) (stating
that birth mothers have pressed for open adoptions in which the birth mother and the adoptive
parents, and sometimes the birth mother and child, are no longer strangers to one another).

Summer 19981

RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY

III. NRTs AND THE EXCLUSIVE FAMILY: PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES
Part III suggests that NRTs call for a more inclusive and diverse
paradigm of the family in ways very analogous to those discussed in
the preceding parts of this Article. NRTs, like the emerging realities
of reconstituted families and open adoptions, are stretching the
boundaries of the traditional notions of family, and are forcing us to
consider a multitude of relationships. Many of the emerging solutions may serve as useful models or starting points in the context of
NRTs.
This Article assumes that there are no disputes as to a child's designated primary caretaker or parent. 198 Most of the abundant literature written on this issue envisions "winners" and "losers."'9 Surrogacy issues, for example, have replaced the nature versus nurture
debate with that of genetics versus gestation.2 0 The literature tends
to reflect the dominant paradigm of the exclusive family: the child

has no more than two parents, leaving the question of who gets cut
out.

Unfortunately, the literature as a whole presents a skewed picture
of the social reality. In the vast majority of NRT scenarios, no questions arise over biological parenthood or legal guardianship. Cases
such as In re Baby M.2 11 orJohnson v. Calver 02 are rather pathological in

this sense. The focus of attention on legal parentage, moreover,
tends to deflect attention from the common problems that arise in
such situations.Y

198. This author's view is that surrogate contracts should not be specifically enforceable and
that there should be a "cooling-off period" following the birth of the child (not preconception).
During that time the gestational mother may decide not to relinquish the child. This would be
very similar to provisions contained in many adoption statutes.
199. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 1,
5-23 (1997) (discussing parental rights, the rights of third parties, and differing standards of
determining custody).
200. See, e.g., Malina Coleman, Gestation, Inten, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of

Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 497 (1996) (examining whether legal motherhood should be based on the preconception intentions of the two women who contribute a
reproduction function, on genetic contributors, or on gestation); Russell-Brown, supra note 44,
at 539. See generallyDorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209 (1995) (exploring racism and genetic ties with the law of surrogacy).
201. 525 A.2d 1128 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), reu'd,537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
202. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
203. Although the subject of lesbian families could be discussed in a number of contexts,
this article includes some discussion of it under sperm donation. See infra Part III.B.
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A. Surroga?04
Surrogacy is not a new concept."
A number of feminist anthropologists have recently expressed considerable concern about the effects of certain NRTs, such as surrogacy and ovum donation, on kinship relationships.
Kinship traditionally involved a convergence of
"blood" or genetic ties to the gestational or nurturing role.2 7 In splitting these aspects of kinship, NRTs may threaten the essence of kinship.0 8 This "splitting" is not unique to NRTs. It is also true of adoption, (at least after birth), and of reconstituted families. Surrogacy is
one of a number of modern family phenomena that challenges previously fundamental assumptions about the essence of family2
The challenge of fundamental assumptions of family is evident in
two respects. First, the traditional legal framework is challenged because there are more than two people involved 20 in creating a child.
Second, it is clear that such surrogacy arrangements are increasing in
frequency, and families are dealing with the initial presence of the
third person in a variety of ways that are not present in the existing
legal system.
Very few surrogacy arrangements end with the refusal of the gesta-

204. The term "surrogate" has been controversial. Currently, in medical circles, it is used to

refer to a woman who carries a fetus for someone else and who contributes her own ovum to
the project. In these circles, the woman who gestates a fetus created with the gametes of the
intended parents is called "the gestational carrier," while the intended parents are generally
simply referred to as the "parents." See SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
[SART] ANNUAL REPORTS. Many feminists have objected to the term "surrogate" on the basis

that it suggests that she is not the "real" mother. In general usage, including legal writing, the
term surrogate is generally understood as the woman who gestates the fetus, whether or not she
contributes her own genetic material. See Erika Hessenthaler, GestationalSurrogacy: Legal Implications of Reproductive Technology, 21 N.C. CENT. LJ. 169, 169-70 (1995). I use the term in this
sense.
205. See Genesis 16:2 (referencing that Abraham's wife, Sarah, recruited her maid, Hagar, to
conceive a child with Abraham and carry it for her).
206. See HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD - CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 109-12
(1994) (stating that the introduction of assisted reproduction and surrogate parenting raises
many new questions about kinship).
207. SARAH FRANKLIN, CELIA LURY, &JACKIE STACEY, OFF-CENTRE: FEMINISM AND CULTURAL
STUDIES (1991); MARILYN STRATHERN, REPRODUCING THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON ANTHROPOLOGY,
KINSHIP AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1992).
208. See RAGONE, supranote 206, at 110 (discussing the separation of biological motherhood
from social motherhood).
209. RAGONE, supranote 206, at 109-14.
210. See Shapo, supranote 190, at 1102 (stating that "a baby may have up to five people who
could be designated as a parent at birth: two genetic parents, a gestational parent, and one or
two people not biologically related to the resulting child who have orchestrated the others' contributions, intending to raise the child").
211. See, e.g; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (stating that "California law,
like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood"). This comment might just as easily
have been made about motherhood.
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tional mother to hand over the child. 2 The case law presents a
rather limited view of the variety of relationships and attitudes involved in surrogacy
213 arrangements. Increasingly, surrogacy means gestationalsurrogacy. In gestational surrogacy an embryo is conceived
in-vit&rJ 4 using the intended parents' gametes and implanted in the
womb of the gestational mother.1 5 Typically, the gestational mother
develops a close relationship with the intended parents, who attend
ultrasound scans, doctor appointments, and other aspects of prenatal
care. Often, the relationship between a gestational mother and the
intended parents involves frequent contact, such as reported feelings
of movement. Recent empirical evidence does suggest that while
most surrogate mothers are involved with the pregnancies and excited at the prospect of new life, they do not waver from the view that
the fetus is the child of the intended parents.6
Psychological profiles indicate that surrogates tend to have narcissistic qualities and place a high value on the altruistic aspect of their
contributions. 7 Carol Sanger cites an example of one program that
deliberately changed its advertising copy from "Help an Infertile
Couple" to "Give the Gift of Life.2 1 8 This change garnered a much
larger response from interested women. 1 9 Anecdotal reports2 suggest that severing the relationship with the intended parents after the
birth can be very difficult for the surrogate mother 22 ' and that the
212. But see Inre Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev'd, 537 A.2d 1227
(NJ. 1988) (discussing the refusal of a surrogate mother to return the child to the biological
father and his wife).
213. See generally Scott B. Rae, ParentalRights and the Definition of Motherhood in SurrogateMotherhood, 3 S.CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.219, 236 (1994) (distinguishing between egg donors
and gestational mothers) [hereinafter Rae, ParentalRights].
214. See id.
at 236.
215. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). Usually, the intended
mother, though ovulating, is incapable of carrying a child, such as when she had a hysterectomy
due to cervical cancer. Many in vitro fertilization (IVF) clinics require that the intended
mother be physically unable to sustain a pregnancy in order to be eligible.
216. See RAGONE, supranote 206, at 38 (discussing surrogate mother's response to the question about "whose baby is it?" Surrogates typically respond that the baby belongs to the couple
with whom she has contracted.).
217. See Andrea Mechanick Braverman et al., Survey Results on the Current Practice of Ovum
Donation, 59 FERTILIY & STERILrrY 1216 (1993). Of course, payment is also a factor. But as
Carol Sanger argues, it is insufficient to explain why women do this, and in any event, some financial incentive is not inconsistent with an altruistic motive. See Sanger, supra note 197, at 46162.
218. Sanger, supra note 197, at 462.
219. Sanger, supra note 197, at 461-62.
220. Interview with staff psychologist at a major fertility clinic (discussing programs with a
psychiatrist) (Notes on file with author).
221. See RAGONE, supranote 206, at 44 (stating that "[mI]any surrogates are quite content to
receive yearly or semi-annual correspondence from their couple, but many other surrogates
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amount of ongoing contact after the birth varies from family to family. Many families maintain a two-way contact, though it is not analogous to shared custody or even visitation per se. Rather, there is occasional contact, primarily between the adults, and the exchange of
cards or photos.
The paradigm of the exclusive nuclear family is at odds with this
picture. The nuclear family seems to favor exclusion of the surrogate
mother. 2 The same paradigm that insists there can be only one father and one mother deems the continuing presence of an "extra"
parent as awkward and threatening.24 However, like the stepfather or
the "ex-father" who is legally eliminated by subsequent adoption, the
connections and relationships between a surrogate and her child will
nevertheless subsist at some level. They are not excluded ab initio by
the "new" family, as the legal paradigm of the exclusive family would
dictate.
The reality of surrogate parenting arrangements suggest that the
surrogate does not assert or wish to assert an active or involved role in
the child's life.2 Rather the surrogate defers to the intended parents
and maintains minimal contact, which is likely to decrease over
time.HI However, our legal paradigms should recognize the ongoing
contributions to the family that a surrogate makes. 7 The importance
of the relationship between the surrogate mother and the intended
parents is amply illustrated by the cases.
In Johnson v. Calvert,2s difficulties arose not because Anna Johnson,
the surrogate, decided that she wanted to keep the child, but because
have no wish to 'terminate their relationships with their couple").
222. See RAGONE, supra note 206, at 44, 89 (describing the continuation of contact between
surrogate mother and parents to exchange cards, photographs, and letters).

223. See generally RAGONE, supranote 206, at 43 (providing instructions from surrogacy programs "that once the child is born they should 'terminate' their relationship in order to allow
the couple 'to get on with being parents' and to allow the surrogate to 'pick up the pieces of
her life").

224. See generally SCOTT B. RAE, THE ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 77
(1994) (discussing the traditional parents as the two determined by biology. Recent reproductive technologies have made this determination more difficult to make.) [hereinafter RAE,
ETHiCS].
225. See Lori B. Andrews, Beyond DoctrinalBoundaries: A Legal Frameworkfor Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2350 (1995) (stating that less than one percent of surrogates change
their mind and make an effort to keep the child).,,
226. RAE, ETHICS, supranote 224, at 101.
227. See RAE, ETHICS, supra note 224, at 104-05 (stating that "[o]nce the legal parents have
been identified in any surrogacy arrangement, then they both may exercise their rights to initiate and develop a relationship with the child, rear the child, and make decisions concerning
the child's upbringing." The author subsequently argues that the fundamental rights of the
surrogate mother to associate with her child are denied by the adoptive couple.).
228.

851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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her relationship with the Calverts, the adoptive parents, ended.2 As
Justice Panelli observed in the summary of facts in the California Supreme Court:
[U]nfortunately, relations deteriorated between the two sides.
Mark learned that Anna had not disclosed she had suffered several
stillbirths and miscarriages. Anna felt Mark and Crispina did not
do enough to obtain the required insurance policy. She also felt
abandoned during an onset of premature labor inJune.s2o
As a result of this breakdown, Anna wrote to the Calverts inJuly 1990,
demanding that they pay her the balance of payments due or else
"she would refuse to give up the child.''3' The Calverts responded
shortly thereafter by seeking a declaration that they were the legal
parents of the unborn child. 22 Anna filed a similar actionss On these
facts, the central dispute clearly did not arise over the question of
who would raise the child, but rather arose as a matter, as Justice
Panelli noted, of deteriorated relations. =
The same can be said with respect to the situation in In re Marriage
of Moschetta'ss In Moschetta, the surrogate mother learned of the contracting couple's marital problems while she was in labor.s The surrogate began to reconsider the surrogacy arrangement, and for two
days refused to allow the father to see the baby.27 She subsequently
agreed to allow the baby to be taken to the couple's home, after the

229. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 29 (discussing Jonhson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993)). Interestingly, more reputable surrogacy programs are increasingly cautious about the
"matching" aspect on the basis that accepting unsuitable candidates or matching incompatible
surrogates/couples is a recipe for problems. See Roberts, supra note 200, at 273 n.256, emphasizing that:
[W]e would not dream of telling pregnant people that when they give birth, the govemnment will decide whether they can keep the child on the basis of whether a social
worker thinks that the child looks like a good match for the particular parenting profile.... Yet social workers routinely make such determinations about poor Black
mothers.
Id. at 273 n.256.
230. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P. 2d at 776, 777-79 (Cal. 1993).
231. Id.at 778.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 777-79. This is not uncommon, and is one reason why IVF dinics tend to deploy
considerable psychological resources in matching and counseling. In effect, as one psychologist
told me, it is enlightened self-interest; experience is showing that the risk of problems and ultimately litigation can be greatly minimized by paying attention to the importance of the relationship between the surrogate mother and the intended parents.

235. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (representing the issue of the enforceability
of a traditional, as opposed to gestational, surrogacy contract).
236. In reMarriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1218, 1223 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
237. Id.
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couple told her they would stay together.m However, the marriage
deteriorated and the surrogate mother soon filed three petitions. 25

The first was for legal separation; a second petition was to establish
custody of the baby; and a third was to establish parental relationship. 20 It was only after the marriage deteriorated that the surrogate
motherjoined the proceedings. 24 1
In both Johnson and Moschetta, the legal framework transformed
(and arguably distorted) these problems into a question of rights
over the child's custody. One effect of this approach is to mask the
importance of the relationship between the surrogate mother and
the intended parents. Once the parties framed the issue in terms of
exclusive parenting rights, the inevitable inference is that the "other
mother" (usually the gestational mother) disappears from view altogether.
A more inclusive vision of the family would retain a place for the
woman who gestates a child.242 This would not be a role of a third
parent in the sense of one who is a primary caretaker/decisionmaker, but would instead be someone who has played a vital part in
the creation of the child, and who is likely to retain an interest (distant in most cases) in the family. 243 It would also reflect the range in
the amount or degree of contact there might be across different families. The message sent by the exclusive paradigm of the family is that
this person should disappear as soon as the baby is born. 244 The message sent by a more inclusive vision would recognize and value her
contribution, as well as her (likely) interest in maintaining some contact with the family. Such a vision might also encourage the intended
parents to acknowledge the need of the surrogate mother to feel that
she is valued for her "gift of life. '' 24' The parties should be encouraged to consider a prenatal agreement concerning post-natal ar238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id at 1223-24.
In reMarriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).

242. See generallyRAE, ETHICS, supranote 224, at 109-11 (arguing that the termination of parental rights of a surrogate based on a contract is unconstitutional and that the emotional
trauma on the surrogate mother is considerable). Therefore, surrogacy contracts that extinguish all contact after birth should be void. Id.
243. See Shapo, supranote 190, at 1195 (discussing the current legal system's inability to address parental claims on children born through artificial reproduction).
244. See Shapo, supra note 190, at 1195 (citing Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families
ThroughAdoption: ImplicationsforCollaborativeAdoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV.997, 1002
(1995) (stating that once a child is legally adopted, the traditional family structure would extinguish the rights of the biological parents)).
245. It appears, however, that counseling in many centers is also performing this role.
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rangements. This would allow parents to decide if, and when, to tell
their children how they came into being.4
The issue of post-natal access is one that could be treated as a
"matching" issue. For example, one could provide for the presumptive enforceability of agreements for whatever forms of ongoing contact the surrogate and the intended parents deem appropriate.247
These agreements could provide a means of expressly recognizing
the roles that a surrogate mother may play. Finally, it is crucial to
emphasize that a more inclusive paradigm would not presuppose any
given degree or type of contact in any particular situation, but would
rather facilitate the wide range of arrangements that one might expect to be as varied as human nature itself.
B. Gamete Donation
1. Lesbian Families and the Question of the Sperm Donor
The notion of the nuclear family does not extend to lesbian families. 248 Lesbians are increasingly resorting to anonymous sperm donors.24 ' Although there may be a number of reasons for this,20 a
prime reason is the concern that donation by a known donor opens
the door to intervention by the donor, or, put another way, threatens

246. The author has some trouble with this, as the author's personal belief is that withholding this sort of information is a recipe for trouble at a later point. Nevertheless, the author believes that the parents who raise the child on a day-to-day basis are in the best position to decide
how and when to address these issues. In the context of article 583 of the CriL CODE OF
QUEBEC [C.C.Q.I, it was held that it is the prerogative of the adoptive parents to reveal to their
child that he or she was adopted before he or she can give a proper consent to an eventual
meeting with the biological parents. See Droit de la famille - 2427 [1996] R.J.Q. 1451 (C.Q.);
Droit de la famille - 657 [1989] RJ.Q. 1693 (C.Q.). See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing article 583
of the QuEBEC CIVIL CODE).
247. For example, an annual photograph.
248. Of course, the ideology of the exclusive family excludes some families from recognition
as families in the first place. Legally speaking, lesbian families are seen as single-parent families
and the status of the co-mother is tenuous at best. Such families are vulnerable to intrusion for
the same reason that unwed fathers are vulnerable to the adoption of their children by stepfathers. That vulnerability lies in the absence of a traditional marriage or at least stable heterosexual relationship within which the child is produced. SeeBernstein, supra note 28, at 24, 39.
249. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 20.
250. One of these may be "separatist," that is the wish to dissociate the raising of children
from men. See Ann Nemesis, The Family is Obsolete, in LESBIAN CONTRADICTION: AJOURNAL OF
IRREVERENT FEMINISM 6 (1994), cited in Bernstein, supranote 28, at 21:
[Why should lesbians, who choose the society of women, desire to be in any way associated with a family..., [a] horrible patriarchal institution ... [?) [I]f the gay community is to be family, and the patriarch, of course, is... male.... this 'alternative'
community [replicates] the oppressive gender roles which most lesbians are trying to
escape.
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the integrity of the lesbian core unit.2

This concern appears to be justified. The case of Thomas S. v. Robin
Y212 arose from the following facts. Robin Y and Sandra R., lesbian
partners, decided to have a child through donor insemination.
Friends introduced them to Thomas S., an attorney, who agreed to
become Robin Y.'s donor.' Although he apparently agreed not to
assert parental rights, the agreement was neither put in writing nor

was a physician intermediary used, which would have invoked statu5

tory protection against a subsequent assertion of paternal rights. "
Robin and Sandra wanted Thomas to be available to the child if and
when she asked to meet her biological father.2o Contact was initiated
when the child was three, and a relationship developed . Initially, it
seems that everyone was very happy with this "inclusive" arrangement.m However, when Thomas requested that the child spend part
of her summer with him and his extended family, Robin and Sandra
3 9 Robin and Sandra testified that they felt that the child was
refused.2
being transformed into the child of a broken home with the implication that her family was incomplete. 26 Thomas S. sued for visitation.261 At trial, Judge Kaufrnan held that Thomas was not entitled to
an order of filiation, a prerequisite to visitation. 2 The appeals court
263
The court of apreversed the judgment in a three-to-five decision.
251. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 21-22 (discussing the pros and cons of using anonymous
sperm donors).
252. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
In Canada there are no cases involving litigation between anonymous sperm donors and a lesbian couple. Rather, the cases dealt with maintenance or custody with respect to children conceived through artificial insemination after the relationship between the two mothers terminates. See, e.g., Anderson v. Luoma [1986J R.F.L.2d 127 (B.C.S.C.).
253. SeeThomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 377, 378 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (discussing the
couples first child through artificial insemination and their desire to have a second child
through the same means, but with a different sperm donor).
254. I& at 378.
255. Id. See Bernstein, supranote 28, at 27-28 (discussing Thomas S. v. Robin Y.).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

S.).

Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 379-80.
Thomas S., 599 N.Y.S.2d at 379. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 28 (discussing Thomas

262. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 382 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1993); see also Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1989) (noting that a number of rights, in addition to visitation, would follow from a declaration of paternity, such as the right to be considered as the
parent who should have custody); Bernstein, supra note 28, at 23 (noting that lesbian families
could be disrupted by sperm donors suing for parental rights).
263. See Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 356; see alsoBernstein, supranote 28, at 35.
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peals reasoned that Thomas' parental rights were terminated without
following the procedures for termination of parental rights under
NewYork's Social Services Law.2u
The message sent by the court of appeals in Thomas S. is that any
contact with the sperm donor carries a significant risk for a lesbian
family. As in Johnson v. Calvert,20 where a breakdown in relations between Anna Johnson and the Calverts transformed into a polarized
battle for legal parentage with very exclusionary results, the dispute
for visitation in this case became a battle over the whole package of
parental rights.2 6 The legal framework creates winners and losers,
and fails to encourage the seeking of common ground. It is hardly
surprising that lesbian families' response is to exclude the donors altogether.267 As Nancy Polikoff cautions, "[iun the present system,
known sperm donors who originally intend to remain unidentified
and uninvolved can later change their minds and gain full parental
rights.,' 2"'

The present exclusionary framework creates and sustains

an incentive to remove the third player, here the male sperm donor.
How might this be different? First, part of the problem lies in the
close link between visitation and parental rights.269 If it were possible
to dissociate the two, it might be possible to succeed in a claim for
27
visitation without gaining full parental rightsY.
Bernstein suggested
that Thomas S. could have approached the issue differently, resulting
in more favorable long term consequences. Thomas might have filed
a conciliatory brief in which he recognized the autonomy interests of
lesbian mothers -

biological mothers and their partners -

while ad-

vocating limited visitation for those donors who form relationships
with their children at the mothers' invitation. 1 Instead, he chose a
strategy that, by confirming the worst fears of lesbian mothers, will
disadvantage all other gay men who hope to parent in cooperation

264. SeeN.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384 (McKINNEY 1992 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 516
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1998) (mandating that a putative or unwed father must sign a waiver
to relinquish rights).
265. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
266. SeeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786-87 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a woman who
enters into a surrogacy arrangement does not have parental rights).
267. See generaUy Bernstein, supranote 28, at 20-25 (discussing reasons some lesbians give for
preferring to use anonymous sperm donors).
268. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 25 (citing Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian
Families:Legal Obstacles, Legal Challnges, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 907 (1986)).
269. See Bernstein, supranote 28, at 53-54 (noting distinctions in state visitation statutes).
270. This is possible for grandparents, and there is some variety from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on this point. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 53-54.
271. Bernstein, supranote 28,at 30.
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with lesbian mothers.2
Disassociating the notion of visitation from the core of parental
authority would facilitate more inclusiveness of the biological father
in circumstances like this. Parents like Robin and Sandra would not
have to look over their shoulders in fear that someone else would be
designated as a primary decision-maker for their child. 2 3 The facts of
the case do seem to suggest that the idea of contact was welcome.274
The "all or nothing" threat presented by the exclusive legal framework created an incentive both for Robin and Sandra to oppose the
visitation and for Thomas to claim parental rights. 27' Robin and Sandra's caution
was very much vindicated by Thomas' subsequent
276
claims.
The analogies to stepparent adoptions, "ex-father" access, and potential issues in surrogacy cases are clear. The analogies point to an
increasing need for a more inclusive middle ground.2 7 Here, as with
surrogacy, it might not be advisable to have the visitation entitlement
spring simply from the status of the arrangement. Rather, there
should be certain triggers. For example, a prior agreement might be
one factor that could trigger a presumption of access or non-access to
the child. 8
In summary, the risks which lesbian families (or heterosexual single mothers) face, encourage them to exclude the donors from playing any role whatsoever. This may mean that the child, and the family as a whole, must forego certain relationships that could be
complementary to, and supportive of, the core unit. Strengthening
the core unit against the risk of intrusion of parental rights by the
donor, while facilitating a range of possible arrangements and relationships, should reduce the incentive to exclude these players.

272. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 30.
273. See generally Bernstein, supra note 28, at 22-23 (noting that lesbian mothers who have
artificial insemination with known donors are "fearful of future interference by the biological

father").
274. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 28.
275. Bernstein, supra note 28, at 31.
276. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 31.
277. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 39 (noting that if children can adjust to having two fathers (stepfathers/adopted fathers) they can adjust to two mothers).
278. See Bernstein, supra note 28, at 33 (objecting on the basis that one cannot sustain a
prior agreement like this without a consideration of the best interests of the child). On the
other hand, this objection does not prevent the operation of presumptions (of access or nonaccess) that could be triggered by prenatal agreement and/or by subsequent contact. See id. at
33.
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2. Anonymous Sperm Donors
The issues with anonymous sperm donors are somewhat different
because a starting premise on all sides is that there will be no contact
and no role played by the biological father at all. 2 9 The extent to
which this is actually true depends on the particular legal framework
that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may depend on the
If the donor and the recipient were
marital status of the mother.
the only persons involved in this arrangement, one could assert unequivocally that the identity of the donor should never be revealed.28
From an instrumental perspective, for example, there is some basis
for concern that many potential donors would be deterred by the
prospect of having their identities revealed.82 However, the issue is
more complicated because the child may want to meet the sperm donor. These issues are similar to those arising in the adoption context
where children may wish to make contact with their biological parents.

2 13

This Article argues that, here again, the rigor of the exclusive family paradigm should be relaxed. In a number of jurisdictions, the
adoption issue has been addressed by means of a central registry of
birth parents seeking children and vice-versa. M Once a child reaches
majority, he or she may register, and if the natural parent also registers, a meeting can be arranged.2 5 There have been a number of difficulties with such registers. If either the biological parent or the
of
child does not register, questions arise about the appropriateness
2 6
contact.
initiating
intermediary
an
the agency acting as
The province of British Columbia, Canada, solved this problem by
279. See Bernstein, supranote 28, at 20 (stating that "[a]lthough there is a man in the story,
we never meet him, and he will never meet his child").
280. Bernstein, supranote 28, at 23.
281. This article assumes that there are and should be means by which non-identifying information, such as medical information or history, may be communicated.
282. See Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1995, at 28
(profiling a number of adults conceived by artifical insemination for whom it became very important to find and meet their biological fathers).
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-113.5 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (1997); IND.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 31, r. 14-20-2 (1998); CODE ME. R. § 9-304 (1997).
285. See CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC [C.C.Q.], article 583 - formerly article 632 of An Act to Establish a New Civil Code and to Reform Family Law, S.Q. 1980, c. 39 - which permits an adopted
person or the biological parent(s) to obtain information enabling one to find the other provided, he or she has previously consented thereto. Although article 583 does not refer to registers perse,it is in fact seen as the legal basis for their existence.
286. Having such an intermediary enter into contract with the person whose consent is required is simply part of the procedure established under former C.C.Q. article 632. Droit de la
famille - 124 [1984] RJ.Q. 2030 (TJ.).
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enacting new legislation that provides open adoption records unless
children or parents file a "disclosure veto" or a "no-contact declaration."1 7 As for Quebec, Canada, courts have struggled with the interpretation of former article 5 8 3 .s"s A few cases have held that allowing
a public agency to contact the biological parents of an adopted person of full age in order to try to ascertain their opinion on an eventual reunion would amount to giving those agencies permission to solicit the biological parents, contrary to article 583 which prohibits
solicitation. 8 9 In Droit de lafamille - 27,2"Judge Sirois stated that the
predecessor article 632 required the biological parents to give their
consent priorto the exercise of the right of the adopted person to obtain information enabling her to find her parents."' On appeal, the
court had to interpret the word "solicitation. ' 2 2 It concluded that
authorizing the Social Services Center to find the applicant's biological parents and inform them that she wanted to meet them does not
constitute solicitation within the meaning of the CodeY The latter
interpretation prevailed over the restrictive approach put forward by
Judge Sirois in Droit de lafamille - 27. Therefore, a prior consent is
no longer required and this view should remain under article 583.2"
Although that questioh appears to be resolved, the debate it generated is nonetheless very relevant for the purposes of this Article. Indeed, the interpretation of the word "solicitation," and the requirement of consent before the exercise of rights under article 583, reflects
the more fundamental tension between the rights at stake in the
adoption context. Those are the rights of the adopted person to

287. Adoption Regulation, B.C. Reg. 291 § 19 (1996) (British Columbia, Can.).
288. The full text of the article reads:

[I]f both father and mother have previously died, the brothers, sisters, and nephews
and nieces in the first degree, of the deceased succeed to him, to the exclusion of the

ascendants and the other collaterals. They succeed either in their own right, or by
representation as provided in the second section of this chapter.

CIViL CODE OF QUEBEC art. 583.
289. See generally Suzanne Pilon, Les Retrouvaills en Matire D'Adoption (Art. 632 C.C.Q), 45

REVUE DU BARREAu [R. du B.] 806 (1985) (discussing case law regarding article 632).
290. [1983] T.J. 2012.

291. Droit de la famife -27 [1984] CA. 526,527.
292. Id.
293. See Droit de la famille - 27 [1984] CA 526 Court; see also Droit de la famille - 124
[1984] T.J. 2012, which is to the same effect.
294. 1 QUEBEC, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMMENTAIRES DU MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE: LE
CODE CIVIL DU QUfBEC article 583 (1993) (explaining that the only innovation will be that the
right provided for in C.C.Q. article 632 for an adopted person of majority is now extended to an
adopted minor fourteen years of age or over, and to a minor under fourteen years of age within
the limits of article 583). This change was brought about in order to achieve harmonization
with the rules regarding consent to treatment. Id.
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9 versus the right to privacy2" of the biological
know his or her originsP
297
parents.
Interestingly enough, fewjudgments explicitly mention these issues
when confronted with situations such as those arising under the new
article 583 of the CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC. One such example is Droit
de lafamille - 2Z2 In that case, Judge Sirois invoked the biological
mother's right to privacy to justify his refusal to grant the applicant's
(adoptee's) motion to obtain information leading to a meeting between her and her mother.m The facts revealed that the biological
mother had clearly and unequivocally declined meeting the child she
had once given up for adoption, after being duly informed of applicant's wish to meet her.300
A similar result was reached by Judge Rivet in Droit de la famille 14031 That case dealt with a motion to allow the examination of an
adoption file (now article 582 of the CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC) and to
communicate with the biological parents. 2 The adopted child involved had leukemia and the best treatment for her was proven to be
a bone marrow transplant. Judge Rivet said that the child's right to
life prevails over confidentiality within the limits necessary to save the
child's life: she expressly refused to allow the child or her biological
parents to communicate in any way. 3
It is safe to say that courts give the right to privacy a great deal of
protectionY 4 This is consistent with the notion of exclusivity. At the
same time, society places a high value on the idea of knowing our biological or genetic roots, which can be understood as an expression of
exclusivity. Thus, there are conflicts in attaining exclusivity, which
likely causes courts to struggle with their decisions regarding modem

295. This view brings more players into the family circle.
296. The right to privacy is entrenched in article 5 of the Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, RLS.Q. ch. C-12 (Can.).
297. Biological parents prefer to keep "interlopers" out of the family circle.
298. 1984 Tj. 2073. After the Quebec Court of Appeal had established the correct parameters of interpretation of article 632, the case returned before judge Sirois for a decision on the

facts.
299.
300
301.
302.

Droit de la famille - 124 [1984] TJ. 2012-13.
Id.
[1984] TJ. 2049.
Id. at 2051.

303. Id. at 2051; see also Droit de la famille - 1677 [1992] R.D.F. 590 (C.Q.), where Judge
Gr~goire granted a motion to consult the adoption file of a 38 year old woman suffering from
diabetes, citing Droit de lafamile - 140 as authority for his decision. There, as well, it was mentioned that the applicant did not want to avail herself of article 632 and to know her biological
parents.
304. Droit de la famille - 1677 [1992] R.D.F. 590 (C.Q.).
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family law issues. Had judges been more willing to depart from the
rigor of the exclusive family paradigm, the problems with the interpretation of article 632 could probably have been avoided altogether.
The broad interpretation of the word "solicitation," which eventually
prevailed, is bound to achieve a better balance between the conflicting rights at stake. In a society where there exist different family arrangements and, in the era of new reproductive technologies, it becomes virtually impossible to ignore the various connections a child
may have with different people. These factors require a relaxation of
the rigor of the exclusive family paradigm.
Quebec has already taken a step in that direction with the creation
of the register in the adoption context and the administrative procedure it presupposes. The procedure established under former article
632 and article 583 of the CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC is clearly a voluntary one: neither the adopted person nor the biological parents have
to apply to the court unless there is a conflict between the parties."'
It is sufficient for the interested party to place his or her request with
the public agency. There is no problem if there is prior consent.
However, absent such consent the public agency investigates and subsequently informs the applicant of the result of its investigation. In
the case of a refusal of the party whose consent is required,0 6 the
meeting between the adopted person and her biological parents does
not take place.
Generally, courts do not interfere with the administrative process
of the public agency, except under exigent circumstances, such as
medical or humanitarian, which justify a rapid processing of the
file. 7 The absence of a positive result, in terms of finding a party or
obtaining its consent, will not give rise to intervention of the court.3 8
s°9 is consistent with a fair balancing of the
This "obligation of means,,
rights of the adopted person and those of the biological parents. The
efficiency of the register, of course, largely depends on the available
310
resources.
305. Droit de la famille - 216 [1985] TJ. 2033; see Pilon, supranote 298, at 808.
306. See cases, supra note 156 (holding that consent presupposes that the adopted person
already knows she was adopted). The procedure under article 583 cannot be used for the purpose of revealing to an adopted person his or her status. Id..
307. See Droit de la famille - 216 [1985] T.J. 2033, 2035-36; see also Pilon, supra note 289, at
808.
308. SeeDroit de la famille -1651 [1992] R.D.F. 478 (C.Q.); Droit de la famille - 1492 [1991]
R.D.F. 550 (C.Q.); Droit de la famille -1359 [1990] R.D.F. 589 (C.Q.); Droit de la Famille 807

[1990] RJ.Q. 1198 (C.Q.).
309. This is a civilian term denoting a duty to make reasonable efforts, as opposed to an 'obligation of result" which denotes a duty to achieve a particular outcome.
310. See Droit de la famille - 1589 [1992] R.D.F. 294 (C.Q.) (explaining that in Quebec, a
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Despite the problems alluded to above, the very existence of such a
register in the adoption context, indicates that society is slowly moving away from the paradigm of the exclusive family. A register acknowledges that an adopted person of majority or minority, or his or
her biological parents, may wish to have some contact in the future.3 11
Moreover, and this is a feature which should please fervent supporters of the traditional nuclear family, the mechanism created under
article 583 does not in any way threaten the structure of the adoptive
family. In fact, article 583 preserves the structure by requiring the
consent of the adoptive parents in addition to that of the biological
parents when the article 583 applicant is an adopted minor under
fourteen years of age. The core family unit constituted by the adoptive family is preserved, while recognizing the potential role of the
biological parents.
The register set up in article 583 could easily be adapted to include
sperm donors. Indeed, the paradigm of the exclusive family "writes
out" the anonymous sperm donor. In much the same way, the paradigm writes out the surrogate mother, birth mothers who put their
children up for adoption, and "ex-fathers" whose children are
adopted by stepfathers. In the context of anonymous sperm donors,
this judicial practice probably reflects the expectations of the majority
of the parties. Moreover, unless one is a true genetic essentialist, it is
obvious that a sperm donor has invested much less than a surrogate
(gestational or not) or an ovum donor. Nonetheless, we should not
rule out the possibility of more inclusive arrangements. Article 583 of
the CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC proves that it is possible to envision a
middle ground. It preserves the integrity of a child's (new) family,
while at the same time allowing for the possibility of including other
people in a child's life, including players who contributed to his or
her birth.
3. Ovum Donors
The field of ovum donation is relatively new, especially in comparison to sperm donation, and has been escalating rapidly in the past
few years. 312 Unlike tthe other areas discussed, there is little case law
thus far. One might imagine cases involving an unmarried recipient
considerable backlog due to scant resources has meant long waits for "matches."). It is interest-

ing to note that, on one particular occasion, the court held that although certain constraints
and delays are inevitable, they should not negate an applicant's right under former article 632.

Id.
311. Such contact rendered possible by article 583 could take several forms, ranging from a
single meeting to ongoing communication.
312. See, e.g.,Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 790-92 (Cal. 1993).
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and a married known donor that could stretch the limits of the law,
such as Johnson v. Calvert.313 In some respects, the chances of such litigation are greater than in the sperm donor cases. The reason for this
is that the donation process is much more onerous and intrusive for
women who donate ovum, requiring drug treatment and physical intrusion which carry some long term risks.1 4 In the case of the known
donor, one might expect that some ongoing contact between the donor and the family might be seen as entirely natural since the donor's
sacrifice is considerable.
The case for providing a more inclusive paradigm, which contemplates and facilitates a range of contact is similar to the cases outlined
above. 315 If the core unit need not fear displacement by the donor,
there is no reason to render the donor invisible as the exclusive family paradigm leads us to do. In the case of anonymous donors, one
might also contemplate a registry system, such as the one outlined
above.
IV. CONCLUSION

At the end of the twentieth century, the paradigm of the exclusive
family has outlived its value. There are two aspects to the traditional
notion. The first is that a child has two parents, and only two parents,
and all parental authority resides within that parental unit. The second is that for most purposes, while that unit exists, everyone else is a
legal stranger to the child. This Article has attempted to sketch out
another model. While this model recognizes the central core of the
parent-child unit for decision-making and related purposes, it expands the potential network of persons who may play supplementary
and complementary roles with respect to the core unit. In other
words, this model sees the family unit as closely connected to the
community around it by explicitly recognizing the varied sorts of
connections that might exist, and contributions that might be made,
to the child's upbringing.
As this Article shows, the legal paradigm of exclusivity has meant
that various actors, from "ex-fathers" replaced by stepfathers, to birth
mothers or surrogate mothers, disappear from view. There are two
problems with this. First, it is increasingly divergent from social practices, and second, it perpetuates the notion that the exclusive family
is the one to which all society should aspire. This, of course, devalues
313. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
314. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778 (citing that surrogates may feel the uncomfortable side effects of labor).
315. The article does not suggest in any way that such contact should be compelled.
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the myriad of other sorts of family arrangements that exist.
NRTs take their place among other emerging social practices with
respect to which people are forging novel and creative relationships
that stretch the boundaries of the traditional family beyond the absolute "one mother and one father" model. The law in this area seems
to be the slowest institution to change. But at a time when fewer and
fewer children live with two parents, when more and more children
live in economically strained conditions, and when the state appears
to be less and less likely to provide support, the "channeling function" of law could be deployed to encourage and support the creation
and maintenance of more connections with those who may have special interests in a particular family or child, and a particular inclination to contribute. 16 Public discourse on child custody tends to lose
sight of the forest through the trees: far more children suffer from
poverty, neglect, and abandonment than suffer as a result of custody
battles. The paradigm of the exclusive family presupposes the converse. From this perspective, social policy should be contemplating
ways of encouraging more people to feel greater levels of responsibility for more children.1 7
These new and diverse relations need not and should not threaten
the integrity of the core unit, and in'the absence of such threats,
many families may choose to foster these connections. In a world in
which too many children suffer from a scarcity of caring adults in
their lives, the perpetuation of an ideology that reinforces this lack of
involvement can only be described as perverse.

316. Sault, supra note 5, at 406. As one author correctly emphasizes, "[m]any of the problems that people face in the United States [and to some extent in Canada] today, are the consequences of cultural definitions that ignore the traditional kinship functions of sharing, cooperation, nurturing and mutual support, while asserting the values of biology, independence and
control." Ri
317. See Sault, supra note 5, at 408 (stating another way of encouraging greater responsibility for the children that we should "accept children in terms of a shared framework for nurturance," as opposed to ownership and control). Once such a framework becomes accepted,
"the legal system could [in turn] be used to devise solutions that accommodate a wider community, making it possible to satisfy more of the participants, and to create a stable and supportive network of kin commensurate with the needs of growing children." This alternative to exclusivity is what Sault refers to as "interdependence." Id. at 408.

